Benjamin Crost, Joseph H. Felter, Hani Mansour, D. Rees
{"title":"现任总统的微弱胜利和选举后的冲突:来自菲律宾的证据","authors":"Benjamin Crost, Joseph H. Felter, Hani Mansour, D. Rees","doi":"10.1093/wber/lhz014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbents’ political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines\",\"authors\":\"Benjamin Crost, Joseph H. Felter, Hani Mansour, D. Rees\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/wber/lhz014\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbents’ political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.\",\"PeriodicalId\":129815,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal\",\"volume\":\"11 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-11-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhz014\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhz014","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines
Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbents’ political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.