为长途/短途的区别对待辩护

The Bell Journal of Economics Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI:10.2307/3003361

D. Friedman

{"title":"为长途/短途的区别对待辩护","authors":"D. Friedman","doi":"10.2307/3003361","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Discriminatory pricing by railroads may be better than marginal cost pricing with a subsidy of the resulting losses, since it gives the railroad correct incentives for deciding what rail lines to build. The argument, applied to long-haul/short-haul discrimination, shows that its prohibition may lead to nonoptimal construction decisions.","PeriodicalId":177728,"journal":{"name":"The Bell Journal of Economics","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"IN DEFENSE OF THE LONG-HAUL/SHORT-HAUL DISCRIMINATION\",\"authors\":\"D. Friedman\",\"doi\":\"10.2307/3003361\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Discriminatory pricing by railroads may be better than marginal cost pricing with a subsidy of the resulting losses, since it gives the railroad correct incentives for deciding what rail lines to build. The argument, applied to long-haul/short-haul discrimination, shows that its prohibition may lead to nonoptimal construction decisions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":177728,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Bell Journal of Economics\",\"volume\":\"35 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Bell Journal of Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003361\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Bell Journal of Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/3003361","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

摘要

铁路公司的歧视性定价可能比边际成本定价和由此产生的损失补贴要好，因为它给了铁路公司正确的激励来决定修建什么样的铁路线。应用于长途/短途歧视的论证表明，禁止长途/短途歧视可能导致非最优建设决策。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

IN DEFENSE OF THE LONG-HAUL/SHORT-HAUL DISCRIMINATION

Discriminatory pricing by railroads may be better than marginal cost pricing with a subsidy of the resulting losses, since it gives the railroad correct incentives for deciding what rail lines to build. The argument, applied to long-haul/short-haul discrimination, shows that its prohibition may lead to nonoptimal construction decisions.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

The Bell Journal of Economics

自引率

0.00%

发文量