物理学禁止自由主义自由吗?

Jeffrey Koperski
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引用次数: 0

摘要

三位著名的物理学家最近提出,自由意志主义的自由是不可能的。在他们看来,在最基本的层面上,自由意志与我们对科学的了解是不相容的。在这里,我展示了他们的论点以naïve版本的还原论为前提,并考虑了两种选择,一种诉诸身心二元论,另一种诉诸涌现论。前者认为自由意志是一种心智能力,是一种不受自然法则支配的非物质实体。后者认为,自由意志是一种突现能力,不能被简化为主体组成原子的性质。然而,这些替代方案面临着同样的问题:它们似乎违反了一条基本定律,即能量守恒定律。我将展示自由意志主义者如何回应这种反对意见。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does Physics Forbid Libertarian Freedom?
Three well-known physicists have recently argued that libertarian freedom is impossible. In their view, free will is incompatible with what we know about science at the most fundamental level. Here I show that their arguments presuppose a naïve version of reductionism and consider two alternatives, one appealing to mind–body dualism and the other to emergentism. The former says that free will is a capacity of one’s mind, an immaterial entity not subject to the laws of nature. The latter says that free will is an emergent capacity that cannot be reduced to the properties of an agent’s constitutive atoms. These alternatives, however, face the same problem: They seem to violate a fundamental law, namely the conservation of energy. I show how the libertarian can respond to this objection.
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