关于FHMQV和HMQV协议的分离

Augustin P. Sarr, P. Elbaz-Vincent
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引用次数: 1

摘要

HMQV协议正在考虑IEEE P1363标准化。我们提供了HMQV(c)协议的补充分析。也就是说,我们指出了在静态私钥泄漏的情况下的密钥泄露模拟和中间人攻击,表明HMQV(-C)协议无法实现其安全目标。接下来,我们将回顾FHMQV的构建模块、设计和安全论证。阐明了HMQV和FHMQV在安全性和效率上的分离,说明了FHMQV相对于HMQV的优势。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
On the separation between the FHMQV and HMQV protocols
The HMQV protocol is under consideration for IEEE P1363 standardisation. We provide a complementary analysis of the HMQV(-C) protocol. Namely, we point out a key compromise impersonation and a man-in-the-middle attack in the case of a static private key leakage, showing that the HMQV(-C) protocols cannot achieve their security goals. Next, we revisit the FHMQV building blocks, design and security arguments. We clarify the security and efficiency separation between HMQV and FHMQV, showing the advantages of FHMQV over HMQV.
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