LUDroid: Android - Web杂交的大规模分析

A. Tiwari, Jyoti Prakash, S. Groß, Christian Hammer
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引用次数: 7

摘要

许多Android应用程序通过WebView组件嵌入网页,并在Android中执行JavaScript代码。混合应用程序利用专用的api来加载资源并在WebView中呈现。此外,Android对象可以与JavaScript世界共享。然而,连接Android和JavaScript世界的接口也可能带来严重的安全威胁:潜在的不受信任的网页及其JavaScript可能会干扰Android环境及其对本地功能的访问。目前还没有全面的分析来评估这种连接两个世界的混合应用程序的影响。为了理解混合应用程序的语义和效果,我们对混合api在野外的使用情况进行了大规模的研究。我们从Google Playstore中随机选择了7500个应用程序,并对其杂交api参数进行了分析和分类。我们的研究结果促进了对混合应用程序的一般理解,以及对潜在程序分析和当前安全状况的影响:我们发现从Android到JavaScript的6375个敏感数据流,其中82%可能流向潜在的不可信代码。我们的分析确定了365个嵌入漏洞的网页,并利用它们作为范例。此外,我们发现653个应用程序中潜在的不受信任的Javascript代码可能会干扰(受信任的)Android对象。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
LUDroid: A Large Scale Analysis of Android – Web Hybridization
Many Android applications embed webpages via WebView components and execute JavaScript code within Android. Hybrid applications leverage dedicated APIs to load a resource and render it in WebView. Furthermore, Android objects can be shared with the JavaScript world. However, bridging the interfaces of the Android and JavaScript world might also incur severe security threats: Potentially untrusted webpages and their JavaScript might interfere with the Android environment and its access to native features. No general analysis is currently available to assess the implications of such hybrid apps bridging the two worlds. To understand the semantics and effects of hybrid apps, we perform a large-scale study on the usage of the hybridization APIs in the wild. We analyze and categorize the parameters to hybridization APIs for 7,500 randomly selected applications from the Google Playstore. Our results advance the general understanding of hybrid applications, as well as implications for potential program analyses, and the current security situation: We discover 6,375 flows of sensitive data from Android to JavaScript, out of which 82% could flow to potentially untrustworthy code. Our analysis identified 365 web pages embedding vulnerabilities and we exemplarily exploit them. Additionally, we discover 653 applications in which potentially untrusted Javascript code may interfere with (trusted) Android objects.
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