Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance

THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN THE AMERICAN DEBATE Over the Strategic Defense Initiative understandably revolves around the extent to which strategic defenses could improve the security of the continental United States. Yet since the end of World War II, that security has been sustained in a collective system that links America to its allies in Europe and the Far East. The linchpin of these security alliances, which have been so successful in assuring postwar stability, has been the ability of U.S. strategic nuclear forces to deter a possible Soviet attack. This alliance security system has proved remarkably resilient and effective, despite changing strategic circumstances and the evolution from a U.S. nuclear monopoly in the late 1940s to the emergence of superpower strategic parity in the mid-1960s. It has also remained effective in the face of changing political circumstances, from the cold war tensions of the 1950s to the beginnings of detente in the late 1960s. The alliance security system has survived the Korean War, the Berlin crises, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, and the recent bitter debate in Europe over the Pershing and cruise missiles. It has functioned from the presidency of Harry Truman to that of Ronald Reagan, keeping the peace between East and West and providing an assuring framework for allied security. By any standard, this is a remarkable achievement. That a dispar ate group of sovereign states, widely separated by geography, historic traditions, and political culture should maintain an alliance for more than forty years is a situation that has few, if any, precedents. It is