信用衍生品欺诈诉讼中的“重要性”要求:“短方”的隐藏作用

Diana Milanesi
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引用次数: 1

摘要

自2006年初至2007年底,美国楼市开始出现低迷迹象,一些对冲基金和投资银行开始开发复杂的卖空策略,这些策略基于复杂的信用衍生品工具,使它们能够表达对美国楼市系统性利差扩大的看跌看法,并无限押注。当美国房地产市场泡沫破裂时,投资银行和对冲基金实现了巨大的正回报,而其他投资者集体失败,看到他们的投资价值实际上消失了。在过去的12个月里,复杂的合成卖空交易受到了美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的严格审查。根据SEC的说法,在此类交易的背景下,投资银行通过隐藏“空头”方在资产池选择过程中的角色和参与,对投资者、担保人和投资组合代理人进行了重大的虚假陈述和遗漏,使多头投资者的经济利益受到损害。对投资银行及其负责构建和营销合成衍生产品的某些高级执行经理的责任的评估,严重依赖于对重要性问题的解决:短方参与选择过程及其不利的经济利益是实质性的吗?如果在案件的所有事实和情况下适当和及时地披露这些信息,一个理性的投资者会如何看待这些信息?在本案的情况下,一个理性的投资者会利用这些信息采取不同的行动吗?本文将尝试回答上述问题,如下所述。第一部分将分析不同类型的信用衍生产品,并讨论信用衍生产品市场的最新创新。第二部分将在反欺诈条款的背景下研究美国证券交易委员会反欺诈执法理论和“重要性”概念。第三部分将在美国证券交易委员会最近分别针对高盛、高盛、摩根大通证券有限责任公司和花旗集团全球市场公司提起的三起信用衍生品欺诈诉讼的背景下,讨论空头方隐藏角色的重要性。最后,第四部分将详细讨论关于重要性问题的潜在法律辩护和事实反驳。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
'Materiality' Requirement in Credit Derivatives Fraud Litigations: The Hidden Role of the 'Short-Party'
Since early 2006 until late 2007 when the U.S. housing market began show signs of distress, certain hedge funds and investment banks started to develop complex short-selling strategies based on sophisticated credit derivatives instruments, which enabled them to express a bearish view of systematic spread widening in the U.S. housing market and place unlimited side bets on it. When the U.S. housing market bubble burst, investment banks and hedge funds realized enormous positive returns whilst other investors collectively failed and saw the value of their investments literally vanished away. During the last twelve months, complex synthetic short selling transactions have come under severe scrutiny by the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”). According to the SEC, in the context of such transactions, investment banks made material misrepresentations and omissions to investors, guarantors and portfolio agents by hiding the role and involvement in the asset pool selection process of the “short” party, with economic interest adverse those of long investors. The assessment of the liability of investment banks and certain of their top executive managers responsible for structuring and marketing the synthetic derivative products critically relies on the resolution of the issue of materiality: was the involvement of the short-party in the selection process and its adverse economic interest material? How would a reasonable investor have viewed this information if properly and timely revealed in the context of all facts and circumstances of the case? Would a reasonable investor have acted differently with the benefit of this information under the circumstances of the case? This essay will attempt to answer the aforesaid questions, as follows. Part I will analyze different types of credit derivative products and discuss latest innovations in credit derivatives market. Part II will examine the SEC antifraud enforcement theories and the concept of “materiality” in the context of antifraud provisions. Part III will, then, discuss the materiality of the hidden role of the short-party in the context of three credit derivatives fraud litigations recently brought by the SEC against, respectively, Goldman, Sachs & Co, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, and Citigroup Global Markets Inc. Lastly, Part IV will address in details potential legal defenses and factual rebuttal on the issue of materiality.
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