Folk-Economic信仰

P. Boyer, Michael Bang Petersen
{"title":"Folk-Economic信仰","authors":"P. Boyer, Michael Bang Petersen","doi":"10.11647/obp.0257.09","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The domain of ‘folk-economics’ consists in explicit beliefs about the economy held by laypeople, untrained in economics, about such topics as, for example, the causes of the wealth of nations, the benefits or drawbacks of markets and international trade, the effects of regulation, the origins of inequality, the connection between work and wages, the economic consequences of immigration, or the possible causes of unemployment. These beliefs are crucial in forming people’s political beliefs and in shaping their reception of different policies. Yet, they often conflict with elementary principles of economic theory and are often described as the consequences of ignorance, irrationality, or specific biases. As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations 1 An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as Boyer, P., & Petersen, M. B. (2017). Folk-Economic Beliefs: An Evolutionary Cognitive Model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 41, 1–51. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001960. Republished with permission from Cambridge University Press. 2 Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Nicolas Baumard, Martin Bisgaard, Timothy Blaine, Thom Scott-Phillips, Don Ross, Paul Rubin, and four anonymous reviewers for thoughtful and detailed comments on a previous version. © 2021 Michael Bang Petersen, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0257.09 160 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, fairness-based partner choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market conditions activates these specific inference systems, resulting in particular intuitions, for example, that impersonal transactions are dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than others to become intuitively compelling, and, as a consequence, exert a crucial influence on political choices. 1. The Domain of Folk-Economic Beliefs 1.1 What Folk-Economic Beliefs Are The term folk-economic beliefs denotes a large domain of explicit, widespread beliefs, to do with economic and policy issues, held by individuals without systematic training in economic theory. These beliefs include mental representations of economic topics as diverse as tariffs, rents, prices, unemployment, and welfare or immigration policies, as well as mental models of interactions between different economic processes, for example, inflation and unemployment. Our perspective on the origins and forms of folk-economics is based on two major assumptions. First, we argue that folk-notions of the economy should not be described solely in terms of deviations from normative economic theory. That has, unfortunately, been the common approach to the subject. Folk-views are generally described as the outcome of ‘biases,’ ‘fallacies,’ or straightforward ignorance. But describing how human cognition fails to work according to some norm of rationality tells us little about how it actually works. Second, we propose to make sense of folk-economic beliefs by considering the environment in which many, if not most, human cognitive mechanisms evolved. The study of folk-economic beliefs should be distinguished from other domains of investigation. Microeconomics addresses actual choices of agents in conditions of scarcity, independently of whatever mental representations trigger these behaviors in actual individuals, and also 161 5. How People Think about the Economy of the representations they may form of their behavior upon reflection. Another field, behavioral economics often uses experimental designs as a way to elucidate tacit motivations and capacities that direct economic choices in contexts where experimenters can manipulate incentives and information flow between agents (Plott, 1974). Finally, neuro-economics elucidates the brain systems involved in appraising utility and making economic decisions (Camerer et al., 2007; Loewenstein et al., 2008). The scope of a study of folk-economics is quite different from these three fields (see Figure 1 ). It focuses on people’s deliberate, explicit beliefs concerning economic facts and processes, for example, that foreign prosperity is good or bad for one’s own nation, that welfare programs are necessary or redundant, that minimal wages help or hurt the poor, and that rent controls make prices go down or up, and so forth. Fig. 1. A summary of the systems and representations involved in forming folkeconomic beliefs. External information about economic matters triggers activation of specific mental systems, which results in both economic behavior and explicit folk-economic beliefs. The latter’s effects on behavior cannot be assumed. Different fields, represented as clouds, focus on different parts of these processes. The model presented here is about the causal arrow linking specific mental systems to the occurrence of folkeconomic beliefs in people’s minds. (Figure by P Boyer. 2017) One should not assume that folk-economic beliefs (henceforth FEBs) have direct and coherent effects on actual economic behaviors. Many FEBs are about macroeconomic processes—for example, the level of unemployment, or the need for foreign trade, or the need for a nation to balance its budget—that are unrelated to people’s everyday transactions. 162 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens Also, even FEBs that do bear on micro-economic realities, for example, on ‘fair’ prices or wages, may remain insulated from the psychological processes that drive actual economic behavior, as we explain below, which is why people may recommend specific policy outcomes and behave in ways that contradict that choice (Smith, 2007). Figure 1 summarizes the different domains of thought and behavior and the research programs involved. 1.2 Why Folk-Economic Beliefs (FEBs) Matter Understanding FEBs is of crucial importance, even if they do not govern people’s economic behavior, because they play a critical role in political choices. Perceptions of macro-economic developments influence how favorably people view the government and how they cast their votes (Nannestad & Paldam, 1994). The translation of inflation, unemployment, and income dynamics into political choices is mediated by people’s beliefs about the economy, for example, whether rising unemployment is affected by government policy (Peffley, 1984; Rudolph, 2003a, 2003b). Similarly, economic beliefs underpin people’s answers to such questions as: Is it a good idea to increase welfare benefits, impose tariffs on imports, cap rent increases, or institute minimum wages? Folkeconomic beliefs constitute a largely unexplored background against which most information about policy is acquired, processed, and communicated among nonprofessionals (Rubin, 2003). 1.3 A Different Approach to the Study of Folk-Economic Beliefs It is a matter of common knowledge that most people, including the educated public in modern democratic societies, do not think like economists (Smith, 2007, pp. 147–166). It is, for instance, a familiar finding that people are overinfluenced by consideration of sunk costs (Magalhães & Geoffrey White, 2016) or fail to consider opportunity costs (Hazlitt, 2010) in evaluating possible courses of action. More important for social and political debates, people often also express views on economic processes that seem misguided, if not downright fallacious, to most professional economists. There is a growing literature documenting this divergence (see, e.g., Blinder & Krueger, 2004; Caplan, 163 5. How People Think about the Economy 2006; Haferkamp et al., 2009; Hirshleifer, 2008; Rubin, 2003; Sowell, 2011; Wood, 2002; Worstall). However, there is still very little research on why such beliefs appear, and why they are so widespread. We argue that many folk-views on the economy are strongly influenced by the operation of non-conscious inference systems that were shaped by natural selection during our unique evolutionary history, to provide intuitive solutions to such recurrent adaptive problems as maintaining fairness in exchange, cultivating reiterated social interaction, building efficient and stable coalitions, or adjudicating issues of ownership, all within small-scale groups of foragers. The inference systems we describe further on are not specified as ad hoc explanations for folk-economic beliefs. All of these systems have been independently documented by evolutionary biologists, psychologists, and anthropologists who focus on such issues as the evolution of exchange and trade, its form in the small-scale societies in which humans evolved, and its consequences for psychological dispositions and preferences that can be observed in experimental studies on individuals in modern societies; for an overview, see Buss (2015). So, we are not proposing a new description or interpretation of the human evolved psychology of exchange, but rather, using prior findings to illuminate the emergence of folk-economic beliefs in modern contexts. 1.4 Models of Folk-Economic Beliefs Are Not Normative The model described here is emphatically not a normative proposal. That is, we do not intend to suggest that there is a right way to consider economic processes, and to evaluate folk-economic beliefs in terms of their validity or coherence. This deserves mention, for two reasons. First, as discussed below, most descriptions of these beliefs, in the literature, were originally motivated by the realization that people do not thin","PeriodicalId":445785,"journal":{"name":"Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Folk-Economic Beliefs\",\"authors\":\"P. 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As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations 1 An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as Boyer, P., & Petersen, M. B. (2017). Folk-Economic Beliefs: An Evolutionary Cognitive Model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 41, 1–51. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001960. Republished with permission from Cambridge University Press. 2 Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Nicolas Baumard, Martin Bisgaard, Timothy Blaine, Thom Scott-Phillips, Don Ross, Paul Rubin, and four anonymous reviewers for thoughtful and detailed comments on a previous version. © 2021 Michael Bang Petersen, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0257.09 160 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, fairness-based partner choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market conditions activates these specific inference systems, resulting in particular intuitions, for example, that impersonal transactions are dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than others to become intuitively compelling, and, as a consequence, exert a crucial influence on political choices. 1. The Domain of Folk-Economic Beliefs 1.1 What Folk-Economic Beliefs Are The term folk-economic beliefs denotes a large domain of explicit, widespread beliefs, to do with economic and policy issues, held by individuals without systematic training in economic theory. These beliefs include mental representations of economic topics as diverse as tariffs, rents, prices, unemployment, and welfare or immigration policies, as well as mental models of interactions between different economic processes, for example, inflation and unemployment. Our perspective on the origins and forms of folk-economics is based on two major assumptions. First, we argue that folk-notions of the economy should not be described solely in terms of deviations from normative economic theory. That has, unfortunately, been the common approach to the subject. Folk-views are generally described as the outcome of ‘biases,’ ‘fallacies,’ or straightforward ignorance. But describing how human cognition fails to work according to some norm of rationality tells us little about how it actually works. Second, we propose to make sense of folk-economic beliefs by considering the environment in which many, if not most, human cognitive mechanisms evolved. The study of folk-economic beliefs should be distinguished from other domains of investigation. Microeconomics addresses actual choices of agents in conditions of scarcity, independently of whatever mental representations trigger these behaviors in actual individuals, and also 161 5. How People Think about the Economy of the representations they may form of their behavior upon reflection. Another field, behavioral economics often uses experimental designs as a way to elucidate tacit motivations and capacities that direct economic choices in contexts where experimenters can manipulate incentives and information flow between agents (Plott, 1974). Finally, neuro-economics elucidates the brain systems involved in appraising utility and making economic decisions (Camerer et al., 2007; Loewenstein et al., 2008). The scope of a study of folk-economics is quite different from these three fields (see Figure 1 ). It focuses on people’s deliberate, explicit beliefs concerning economic facts and processes, for example, that foreign prosperity is good or bad for one’s own nation, that welfare programs are necessary or redundant, that minimal wages help or hurt the poor, and that rent controls make prices go down or up, and so forth. Fig. 1. A summary of the systems and representations involved in forming folkeconomic beliefs. External information about economic matters triggers activation of specific mental systems, which results in both economic behavior and explicit folk-economic beliefs. The latter’s effects on behavior cannot be assumed. Different fields, represented as clouds, focus on different parts of these processes. The model presented here is about the causal arrow linking specific mental systems to the occurrence of folkeconomic beliefs in people’s minds. (Figure by P Boyer. 2017) One should not assume that folk-economic beliefs (henceforth FEBs) have direct and coherent effects on actual economic behaviors. Many FEBs are about macroeconomic processes—for example, the level of unemployment, or the need for foreign trade, or the need for a nation to balance its budget—that are unrelated to people’s everyday transactions. 162 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens Also, even FEBs that do bear on micro-economic realities, for example, on ‘fair’ prices or wages, may remain insulated from the psychological processes that drive actual economic behavior, as we explain below, which is why people may recommend specific policy outcomes and behave in ways that contradict that choice (Smith, 2007). Figure 1 summarizes the different domains of thought and behavior and the research programs involved. 1.2 Why Folk-Economic Beliefs (FEBs) Matter Understanding FEBs is of crucial importance, even if they do not govern people’s economic behavior, because they play a critical role in political choices. Perceptions of macro-economic developments influence how favorably people view the government and how they cast their votes (Nannestad & Paldam, 1994). The translation of inflation, unemployment, and income dynamics into political choices is mediated by people’s beliefs about the economy, for example, whether rising unemployment is affected by government policy (Peffley, 1984; Rudolph, 2003a, 2003b). Similarly, economic beliefs underpin people’s answers to such questions as: Is it a good idea to increase welfare benefits, impose tariffs on imports, cap rent increases, or institute minimum wages? Folkeconomic beliefs constitute a largely unexplored background against which most information about policy is acquired, processed, and communicated among nonprofessionals (Rubin, 2003). 1.3 A Different Approach to the Study of Folk-Economic Beliefs It is a matter of common knowledge that most people, including the educated public in modern democratic societies, do not think like economists (Smith, 2007, pp. 147–166). It is, for instance, a familiar finding that people are overinfluenced by consideration of sunk costs (Magalhães & Geoffrey White, 2016) or fail to consider opportunity costs (Hazlitt, 2010) in evaluating possible courses of action. More important for social and political debates, people often also express views on economic processes that seem misguided, if not downright fallacious, to most professional economists. There is a growing literature documenting this divergence (see, e.g., Blinder & Krueger, 2004; Caplan, 163 5. How People Think about the Economy 2006; Haferkamp et al., 2009; Hirshleifer, 2008; Rubin, 2003; Sowell, 2011; Wood, 2002; Worstall). However, there is still very little research on why such beliefs appear, and why they are so widespread. We argue that many folk-views on the economy are strongly influenced by the operation of non-conscious inference systems that were shaped by natural selection during our unique evolutionary history, to provide intuitive solutions to such recurrent adaptive problems as maintaining fairness in exchange, cultivating reiterated social interaction, building efficient and stable coalitions, or adjudicating issues of ownership, all within small-scale groups of foragers. The inference systems we describe further on are not specified as ad hoc explanations for folk-economic beliefs. All of these systems have been independently documented by evolutionary biologists, psychologists, and anthropologists who focus on such issues as the evolution of exchange and trade, its form in the small-scale societies in which humans evolved, and its consequences for psychological dispositions and preferences that can be observed in experimental studies on individuals in modern societies; for an overview, see Buss (2015). So, we are not proposing a new description or interpretation of the human evolved psychology of exchange, but rather, using prior findings to illuminate the emergence of folk-economic beliefs in modern contexts. 1.4 Models of Folk-Economic Beliefs Are Not Normative The model described here is emphatically not a normative proposal. That is, we do not intend to suggest that there is a right way to consider economic processes, and to evaluate folk-economic beliefs in terms of their validity or coherence. This deserves mention, for two reasons. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

经济事件的外部信息触发特定心理系统的激活,从而导致经济行为和显性的民间经济信仰。后者对行为的影响是无法假设的。不同的领域,表示为云,关注这些过程的不同部分。这里提出的模型是关于将特定的心理系统与人们头脑中民间经济信念的发生联系起来的因果箭头。(图由P Boyer. 2017)我们不应该假设民间经济信仰(以下简称FEBs)对实际经济行为有直接和连贯的影响。许多feb是关于宏观经济过程的,例如,失业水平,对外贸易的需求,或者一个国家平衡预算的需求,这些都与人们的日常交易无关。此外,即使feb确实影响微观经济现实,例如“公平”价格或工资,也可能与驱动实际经济行为的心理过程隔绝,正如我们下面解释的那样,这就是为什么人们可能会推荐特定的政策结果,并以与选择相矛盾的方式行事(Smith, 2007)。图1总结了思想和行为的不同领域以及所涉及的研究项目。民俗经济信仰(FEBs)是至关重要的,即使它们不支配人们的经济行为,因为它们在政治选择中起着关键作用。对宏观经济发展的看法会影响人们对政府的看法以及他们如何投票(Nannestad & Paldam, 1994)。通货膨胀、失业和收入动态转化为政治选择是由人们对经济的信念介导的,例如,失业率上升是否受到政府政策的影响(Peffley, 1984;Rudolph, 2003a, 2003b)。同样,经济学信念也支撑着人们对以下问题的回答:增加福利、征收进口关税、限制租金上涨或制定最低工资标准是好主意吗?民间经济学信念构成了一个很大程度上未被探索的背景,在这个背景下,大多数关于政策的信息是在非专业人士之间获得、处理和交流的(Rubin, 2003)。这是一个常识问题,大多数人,包括现代民主社会中受过教育的公众,不像经济学家那样思考(史密斯,2007,第147-166页)。例如,一个熟悉的发现是,在评估可能的行动方案时,人们受到沉没成本考虑的过度影响(magalhes和Geoffrey White, 2016)或未能考虑机会成本(Hazlitt, 2010)。对于社会和政治辩论来说,更重要的是,在大多数专业经济学家看来,人们对经济过程表达的观点即使不是彻头彻尾的谬误,也是被误导的。越来越多的文献记录了这种差异(参见Blinder & Krueger, 2004;卡普兰(1663年)人们如何看待经济2006;Haferkamp et al., 2009;Hirshleifer, 2008;鲁宾,2003;索厄尔,2011;木,2002;Worstall)。然而,关于为什么会出现这种信念,以及为什么它们如此普遍的研究仍然很少。我们认为,许多关于经济的民间观点受到无意识推理系统运作的强烈影响,这些系统是在我们独特的进化历史中由自然选择形成的,为诸如维持交换公平、培养重复的社会互动、建立有效和稳定的联盟或裁决所有权问题等反复出现的适应性问题提供直观的解决方案,这些问题都发生在小规模的觅食者群体中。我们进一步描述的推理系统并没有被指定为对民间经济信仰的特别解释。所有这些系统都被进化生物学家、心理学家和人类学家独立地记录下来,他们关注的问题包括交换和贸易的进化,它在人类进化的小规模社会中的形式,以及它对现代社会中个体的心理倾向和偏好的影响;有关概述,请参阅Buss(2015)。因此,我们并不是要对人类进化的交换心理提出新的描述或解释,而是要利用先前的发现来阐明现代背景下民间经济信仰的出现。1.4民间经济信仰的模型不规范这里描述的模型显然不是一个规范的建议。也就是说,我们并不打算建议有一种正确的方式来考虑经济过程,并根据其有效性或一致性来评估民间经济信仰。这一点值得一提,原因有二。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Folk-Economic Beliefs
The domain of ‘folk-economics’ consists in explicit beliefs about the economy held by laypeople, untrained in economics, about such topics as, for example, the causes of the wealth of nations, the benefits or drawbacks of markets and international trade, the effects of regulation, the origins of inequality, the connection between work and wages, the economic consequences of immigration, or the possible causes of unemployment. These beliefs are crucial in forming people’s political beliefs and in shaping their reception of different policies. Yet, they often conflict with elementary principles of economic theory and are often described as the consequences of ignorance, irrationality, or specific biases. As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations 1 An earlier version of this chapter was originally published as Boyer, P., & Petersen, M. B. (2017). Folk-Economic Beliefs: An Evolutionary Cognitive Model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 41, 1–51. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001960. Republished with permission from Cambridge University Press. 2 Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Nicolas Baumard, Martin Bisgaard, Timothy Blaine, Thom Scott-Phillips, Don Ross, Paul Rubin, and four anonymous reviewers for thoughtful and detailed comments on a previous version. © 2021 Michael Bang Petersen, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0257.09 160 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, fairness-based partner choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market conditions activates these specific inference systems, resulting in particular intuitions, for example, that impersonal transactions are dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than others to become intuitively compelling, and, as a consequence, exert a crucial influence on political choices. 1. The Domain of Folk-Economic Beliefs 1.1 What Folk-Economic Beliefs Are The term folk-economic beliefs denotes a large domain of explicit, widespread beliefs, to do with economic and policy issues, held by individuals without systematic training in economic theory. These beliefs include mental representations of economic topics as diverse as tariffs, rents, prices, unemployment, and welfare or immigration policies, as well as mental models of interactions between different economic processes, for example, inflation and unemployment. Our perspective on the origins and forms of folk-economics is based on two major assumptions. First, we argue that folk-notions of the economy should not be described solely in terms of deviations from normative economic theory. That has, unfortunately, been the common approach to the subject. Folk-views are generally described as the outcome of ‘biases,’ ‘fallacies,’ or straightforward ignorance. But describing how human cognition fails to work according to some norm of rationality tells us little about how it actually works. Second, we propose to make sense of folk-economic beliefs by considering the environment in which many, if not most, human cognitive mechanisms evolved. The study of folk-economic beliefs should be distinguished from other domains of investigation. Microeconomics addresses actual choices of agents in conditions of scarcity, independently of whatever mental representations trigger these behaviors in actual individuals, and also 161 5. How People Think about the Economy of the representations they may form of their behavior upon reflection. Another field, behavioral economics often uses experimental designs as a way to elucidate tacit motivations and capacities that direct economic choices in contexts where experimenters can manipulate incentives and information flow between agents (Plott, 1974). Finally, neuro-economics elucidates the brain systems involved in appraising utility and making economic decisions (Camerer et al., 2007; Loewenstein et al., 2008). The scope of a study of folk-economics is quite different from these three fields (see Figure 1 ). It focuses on people’s deliberate, explicit beliefs concerning economic facts and processes, for example, that foreign prosperity is good or bad for one’s own nation, that welfare programs are necessary or redundant, that minimal wages help or hurt the poor, and that rent controls make prices go down or up, and so forth. Fig. 1. A summary of the systems and representations involved in forming folkeconomic beliefs. External information about economic matters triggers activation of specific mental systems, which results in both economic behavior and explicit folk-economic beliefs. The latter’s effects on behavior cannot be assumed. Different fields, represented as clouds, focus on different parts of these processes. The model presented here is about the causal arrow linking specific mental systems to the occurrence of folkeconomic beliefs in people’s minds. (Figure by P Boyer. 2017) One should not assume that folk-economic beliefs (henceforth FEBs) have direct and coherent effects on actual economic behaviors. Many FEBs are about macroeconomic processes—for example, the level of unemployment, or the need for foreign trade, or the need for a nation to balance its budget—that are unrelated to people’s everyday transactions. 162 Human Cultures through the Scientific Lens Also, even FEBs that do bear on micro-economic realities, for example, on ‘fair’ prices or wages, may remain insulated from the psychological processes that drive actual economic behavior, as we explain below, which is why people may recommend specific policy outcomes and behave in ways that contradict that choice (Smith, 2007). Figure 1 summarizes the different domains of thought and behavior and the research programs involved. 1.2 Why Folk-Economic Beliefs (FEBs) Matter Understanding FEBs is of crucial importance, even if they do not govern people’s economic behavior, because they play a critical role in political choices. Perceptions of macro-economic developments influence how favorably people view the government and how they cast their votes (Nannestad & Paldam, 1994). The translation of inflation, unemployment, and income dynamics into political choices is mediated by people’s beliefs about the economy, for example, whether rising unemployment is affected by government policy (Peffley, 1984; Rudolph, 2003a, 2003b). Similarly, economic beliefs underpin people’s answers to such questions as: Is it a good idea to increase welfare benefits, impose tariffs on imports, cap rent increases, or institute minimum wages? Folkeconomic beliefs constitute a largely unexplored background against which most information about policy is acquired, processed, and communicated among nonprofessionals (Rubin, 2003). 1.3 A Different Approach to the Study of Folk-Economic Beliefs It is a matter of common knowledge that most people, including the educated public in modern democratic societies, do not think like economists (Smith, 2007, pp. 147–166). It is, for instance, a familiar finding that people are overinfluenced by consideration of sunk costs (Magalhães & Geoffrey White, 2016) or fail to consider opportunity costs (Hazlitt, 2010) in evaluating possible courses of action. More important for social and political debates, people often also express views on economic processes that seem misguided, if not downright fallacious, to most professional economists. There is a growing literature documenting this divergence (see, e.g., Blinder & Krueger, 2004; Caplan, 163 5. How People Think about the Economy 2006; Haferkamp et al., 2009; Hirshleifer, 2008; Rubin, 2003; Sowell, 2011; Wood, 2002; Worstall). However, there is still very little research on why such beliefs appear, and why they are so widespread. We argue that many folk-views on the economy are strongly influenced by the operation of non-conscious inference systems that were shaped by natural selection during our unique evolutionary history, to provide intuitive solutions to such recurrent adaptive problems as maintaining fairness in exchange, cultivating reiterated social interaction, building efficient and stable coalitions, or adjudicating issues of ownership, all within small-scale groups of foragers. The inference systems we describe further on are not specified as ad hoc explanations for folk-economic beliefs. All of these systems have been independently documented by evolutionary biologists, psychologists, and anthropologists who focus on such issues as the evolution of exchange and trade, its form in the small-scale societies in which humans evolved, and its consequences for psychological dispositions and preferences that can be observed in experimental studies on individuals in modern societies; for an overview, see Buss (2015). So, we are not proposing a new description or interpretation of the human evolved psychology of exchange, but rather, using prior findings to illuminate the emergence of folk-economic beliefs in modern contexts. 1.4 Models of Folk-Economic Beliefs Are Not Normative The model described here is emphatically not a normative proposal. That is, we do not intend to suggest that there is a right way to consider economic processes, and to evaluate folk-economic beliefs in terms of their validity or coherence. This deserves mention, for two reasons. First, as discussed below, most descriptions of these beliefs, in the literature, were originally motivated by the realization that people do not thin
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