预防性打击与反情报和对攻击目标的保护

Huan Yu, Jun Yang, Yu Zhao, G. Levitin, Xiaoyang Ma, Xuejuan Liu, R. Peng
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引用次数: 1

摘要

防御者保护目标免受攻击。它可以执行两种策略。一是被动防御战略。二是积极防御战略。当防御方采取被动防御策略时,可以通过伪装来误导攻击方。当防御方采取主动防御策略时,对攻击方进行预防性攻击。然后,防御者会暴露自己,因此,攻击者不需要智力竞赛就能检测到目标。根据防御方所选择的策略,攻击方应该在双对局中成功摧毁目标。在被动防御的情况下,它应该赢得目标情报和影响竞赛。在积极防御的情况下,应在预防性打击和冲击性竞赛中获胜。攻击者将资源分配给情报、冲击和自我保护,防御者将资源分配给反情报、保护和预防性打击。攻击者试图将目标漏洞最大化,而防御者则希望将其最小化。本文发展了两个非合作的两期极小极大对策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Preventive strike vs. counter intelligence and protection for a target under attack
A defender protects a target from being attacked. It can carry out two kinds of strategies. One is passive defense strategy. The other is active defense strategy. When the defender executes the passive defense strategy, it can deploy camouflage to misinform the attacker. When the defender runs the active defense strategy, it strikes the attacker preventively. Then, the defender will reveals itself and therefore, the attacker detects the target without the intelligence contest. Depending on the strategy chosen by the defender, the attacker should succeed in double contest games to destroy the target. In the case of passive defense it should win the target intelligence and impact contests. In the case of active defense it should win the preventive strike and impact contests. The attacker allocates its resources among the intelligence, the impact and self-protection efforts, whereas the defender distributes its resources among the counter intelligence, protection and the preventive strike efforts. The attacker attempts to maximize the target vulnerability, but oppositely the defender desires to minimize it. The paper develops two non-cooperative two-period minmax games.
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