Conclusions

At the outset of this paper, the authors set out to present the current balance of power in the Arctic region. The paper was structured to achieve two subordinate objectives: assess the present Russia-NATO balance of power in the Arctic; and analyse the level of ambition that Russian investment in the region can support. A key finding that emerges from the research is the degree to which the Arctic is a region in which a balance of power exists, but is heavily tilted towards offence. In particular, the weaknesses of both sides over the defensive components of subsurface warfare render aggressive submarine activity an increasingly appealing option for NATO. This dynamic extends to the surface, however, with NATO paying a heavier price for maintaining a reactive posture than adopting a forward maritime posture. The regional balance of power is also based on temporal and geographical factors. In the Western Arctic and the High North, where the bulk of Russia’s military and economic interests lie, it appears to have effective escalation dominance. On the ground, in the air and, in many cases, at sea, Russian forces can achieve a dominant position, at least in the early stages of a conflict. The ability of Russian submarines to penetrate NATO barriers will make the reinforcement of the High North difficult, should conflict erupt there. If NATO has sufficient warning times to build up to the force levels seen during Exercise Trident Juncture and demanded by the NRI, by contrast, the balance of power is more contested, the Alliance enjoying offensive advantages but struggling when Russian forces take the operational initiative. Russia’s position in the central and eastern parts of the Arctic is more tenuous. While it can exert a significant level of influence over the NSR, Russia’s air-defence network here is less dense than on the Kola Peninsula. This could be crucial should NATO choose to escalate horizontally using US strategic bombers. In the eastern parts of the Arctic, a relatively thin Russian air and sea defence network would be vulnerable to operations from Alaska. In both cases, this might