Olga Fullana, Alba María Priego de la Cruz, David Toscano
{"title":"CEO薪酬与风险承担:来自欧洲上市酒店公司的证据","authors":"Olga Fullana, Alba María Priego de la Cruz, David Toscano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3743575","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation policies and financial performance in the European hotel sector. We analyze CEO cash-, equity- and total-compensation relationships with two accounting-based and two market-based financial performance proxies, including a bi-dimensional proxy formed by stock market return and risk. This bi-dimensional market-based financial performance proxy enables us to take a deep dive into the relationship between CEO compensation policies and firm risk-taking. We then analyze the nature of this relationship by decomposing market-based risk into systematic and idiosyncratic risk, using five alternative asset-pricing factorial models. Our results support a negative and significant relationship between CEO compensation policies and risk-taking by hotel firms. Moreover, we present evidence that relates this result directly with the idiosyncratic risk assumed by these European companies.","PeriodicalId":279731,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors eJournal","volume":"81 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking: Evidence from Listed European Hotel Firms\",\"authors\":\"Olga Fullana, Alba María Priego de la Cruz, David Toscano\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3743575\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation policies and financial performance in the European hotel sector. We analyze CEO cash-, equity- and total-compensation relationships with two accounting-based and two market-based financial performance proxies, including a bi-dimensional proxy formed by stock market return and risk. This bi-dimensional market-based financial performance proxy enables us to take a deep dive into the relationship between CEO compensation policies and firm risk-taking. We then analyze the nature of this relationship by decomposing market-based risk into systematic and idiosyncratic risk, using five alternative asset-pricing factorial models. Our results support a negative and significant relationship between CEO compensation policies and risk-taking by hotel firms. Moreover, we present evidence that relates this result directly with the idiosyncratic risk assumed by these European companies.\",\"PeriodicalId\":279731,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors eJournal\",\"volume\":\"81 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-11-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3743575\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance: Compensation of Executive & Directors eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3743575","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking: Evidence from Listed European Hotel Firms
This paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation policies and financial performance in the European hotel sector. We analyze CEO cash-, equity- and total-compensation relationships with two accounting-based and two market-based financial performance proxies, including a bi-dimensional proxy formed by stock market return and risk. This bi-dimensional market-based financial performance proxy enables us to take a deep dive into the relationship between CEO compensation policies and firm risk-taking. We then analyze the nature of this relationship by decomposing market-based risk into systematic and idiosyncratic risk, using five alternative asset-pricing factorial models. Our results support a negative and significant relationship between CEO compensation policies and risk-taking by hotel firms. Moreover, we present evidence that relates this result directly with the idiosyncratic risk assumed by these European companies.