抵押贷款经纪人,发起费用,价格透明度和竞争

B. Ambrose, James N. Conklin
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引用次数: 31

摘要

本文考察了抵押贷款经纪人竞争、发起费用和价格透明度之间的动态关系。采用逆向首价密封竞价模型激励经纪人定价行为。我们的实证分析证实了模型的预测,表明大都市统计区的抵押贷款经纪竞争加剧导致费用降低。这些发现对于不同的收费标准和不同的竞争标准都是强有力的。我们还提供证据表明,经纪人竞争也降低了零售(非经纪人)贷款的抵押贷款发起费用。此外,我们的研究结果表明,定价复杂性是费用的一个重要决定因素,经纪人竞争的增加与贷款定价透明度的更高可能性有关。我们的研究结果表明,抵押贷款经纪人增加了竞争,降低了抵押贷款市场的费用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mortgage Brokers, Origination Fees, Price Transparency and Competition
type="main"> This article examines the dynamics between mortgage broker competition, origination fees and price transparency. A reverse first-price sealed-bid auction model is used to motivate broker pricing behavior. Confirming the model predictions, our empirical analysis shows that increased mortgage brokerage competition at the Metropolitan Statistical Area level leads to lower fees. The findings are robust to different measures of fees as well as different measures of competition. We also provide evidence that broker competition reduces mortgage origination fees on retail (nonbrokered) loans as well. In addition, our results indicate that pricing complexity is an important determinant of fees, and increased broker competition is associated with a higher probability of a loan being priced with transparency. Our results suggest that mortgage brokers increase competition and lower fees in the mortgage market.
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