信息不对称条件下的委托代理模型与风险分析

2011 International Conference on Management Science & Engineering 18th Annual Conference Proceedings Pub Date : 2011-11-07 DOI:10.1109/ICMSE.2011.6069963

Zhang Guang-ming

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文从实际经济生活出发，描述了一种信息不对称条件下的委托代理模型。通过对模型最优解的分析，我们发现代理人的风险偏好直接影响到最优激励机制和委托人与代理人的风险分担，并赋予激励契约中的一个参数以新的经济表示。

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Principal-agent model and risk analysis under asymmetric information condition

The paper describes a kind of principal-agent model under asymmetric information condition from actual economic life. Through the analysis on optimal solution of the model, we discover that the risk appetite of the agent has a direct effect on the optimal incentive mechanism and the risk sharing of principal and agent, and also endow a parameter in the incentive contract with new economic presentation.

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2011 International Conference on Management Science & Engineering 18th Annual Conference Proceedings

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