探索雷曼兄弟的崩溃和从未发生的救助

Marvin Kyle Abreu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

雷曼兄弟是2008年全球金融危机期间唯一一家没有得到纾困的金融机构,本文试图粗略地综合一下用来解释雷曼兄弟破产的常见说法。因此,本文探讨了雷曼倒闭的理由,比如雷曼不是太大而不能倒闭,雷曼没有足够的抵押品,以及美联储没有支持雷曼的法律权力。论文的结论是,现有的证据并不支持这些叙述。为了进一步分析,本文提出了文献中的另一种假设,即雷曼兄弟的破产可归因于诸如错误时机等偶然事件。此外,美联储对其他破产机构的救助也可归因于偶然性,而非与雷曼财务状况的实际差异。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Exploring the Collapse of Lehman Brothers and the Bailout that Never Happened
This paper attempts a cursory synthesis of common narratives used to explain the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the only financial institution that was not bailed out during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. As such the paper explores justifications for Lehman’s demise such as Lehman was not too big to fail, Lehman did not have sufficient collateral, and the Fed having no legal authority to support Lehman. The paper concludes that the available evidence does not support these narratives. The paper puts forward for further analysis an alternative hypothesis within the literature that Lehman’s failure can be attributed to contingencies such as wrong timing. Furthermore, the rescue of other failing institutions by the Fed can also be attributed to contingencies and not to actual differences with Lehman’s financial situation.
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