有限的关注、有动机的机构投资者和IPO的生存能力

Haoyu Gao, R. Jiang, Wei Liu, Junbo Wang, Chunchi Wu
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摘要

本章利用首次公开发行(IPO)非自愿退市的数据,考察了有动机的机构投资者是否以及如何影响IPO公司的生存能力。实证证据表明,拥有更积极的机构投资者的ipo,未来退市的可能性要低得多。这种影响在信息不对称程度较高的企业中更为明显。积极的机构投资者也促进了更好的上市后经营业绩。研究结果与有限注意理论的预测一致。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Limited Attention, Motivated Institutional Investors, and IPO Survivability
Using initial public offering (IPO) involuntary delisting data, this chapter examines whether and how motivated institutional investors affect the survivability of IPO firms. The empirical evidence shows that the likelihood of future delisting is much lower for IPOs with more motivated institutional investors. This impact is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. The motivated institutional investors also facilitate better post-IPO operating performance. The results are consistent with the prediction of the limited attention theory.
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