那些(战略)噪音是什么?CEO继任中的预期印象管理

Scott D. Graffin, Mason A. Carpenter, Steven Boivie
{"title":"那些(战略)噪音是什么?CEO继任中的预期印象管理","authors":"Scott D. Graffin, Mason A. Carpenter, Steven Boivie","doi":"10.1002/SMJ.906","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We develop and test a novel theory about strategic noise with regard to CEO appointments. Strategic noise is an anticipatory and preemptive form of impression management. At the time it announces a new CEO, a board of directors seeks to manage stakeholder impressions by at the same time releasing confounding information about other significant events. Several CEO and firm characteristics affect the likelihood that this will happen. Strategic noise is most likely for very long-term CEOs with a wide pay gap between other top managers at high stock price performance firms, and when a new CEO does not have previous CEO experience or comes from a less well-regarded firm. Results showing that CEO succession announcements are noisier than they would be by chance have some interesting implications for impression management theory, traditional event study methodology, and managerial and public policy. Interviews with public firm directors on CEO succession provide additional validity for the strategic noise construct and help us to articulate key elements of the theory.","PeriodicalId":347848,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Management eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"167","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What’s All That (Strategic) Noise? Anticipatory Impression Management in CEO Succession\",\"authors\":\"Scott D. Graffin, Mason A. Carpenter, Steven Boivie\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/SMJ.906\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We develop and test a novel theory about strategic noise with regard to CEO appointments. Strategic noise is an anticipatory and preemptive form of impression management. At the time it announces a new CEO, a board of directors seeks to manage stakeholder impressions by at the same time releasing confounding information about other significant events. Several CEO and firm characteristics affect the likelihood that this will happen. Strategic noise is most likely for very long-term CEOs with a wide pay gap between other top managers at high stock price performance firms, and when a new CEO does not have previous CEO experience or comes from a less well-regarded firm. Results showing that CEO succession announcements are noisier than they would be by chance have some interesting implications for impression management theory, traditional event study methodology, and managerial and public policy. Interviews with public firm directors on CEO succession provide additional validity for the strategic noise construct and help us to articulate key elements of the theory.\",\"PeriodicalId\":347848,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance & Management eJournal\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-05-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"167\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance & Management eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1002/SMJ.906\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance & Management eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1002/SMJ.906","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 167

摘要

我们开发并测试了一个关于CEO任命的战略噪音的新理论。战略噪音是印象管理的一种预见性和先发制人的形式。在宣布新任首席执行官的同时,董事会试图通过发布有关其他重大事件的令人困惑的信息来管理利益相关者的印象。CEO和公司的几个特点影响了这种情况发生的可能性。战略噪音最有可能出现在那些长期任职的CEO身上,这些CEO在高股价公司与其他高管之间的薪酬差距很大,或者新任CEO之前没有担任CEO的经验,或者来自一家口碑不佳的公司。研究结果显示,CEO继任公告的噪音比偶然的时候更大,这对印象管理理论、传统的事件研究方法以及管理和公共政策都有一些有趣的启示。与上市公司董事就CEO继任问题进行的访谈为战略噪音构建提供了额外的有效性,并帮助我们阐明了该理论的关键要素。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What’s All That (Strategic) Noise? Anticipatory Impression Management in CEO Succession
We develop and test a novel theory about strategic noise with regard to CEO appointments. Strategic noise is an anticipatory and preemptive form of impression management. At the time it announces a new CEO, a board of directors seeks to manage stakeholder impressions by at the same time releasing confounding information about other significant events. Several CEO and firm characteristics affect the likelihood that this will happen. Strategic noise is most likely for very long-term CEOs with a wide pay gap between other top managers at high stock price performance firms, and when a new CEO does not have previous CEO experience or comes from a less well-regarded firm. Results showing that CEO succession announcements are noisier than they would be by chance have some interesting implications for impression management theory, traditional event study methodology, and managerial and public policy. Interviews with public firm directors on CEO succession provide additional validity for the strategic noise construct and help us to articulate key elements of the theory.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信