对欧盟委员会关于收购投标指令适用情况的报告的回应

P. Böckli, P. Davies, Eilís Ferran, G. Ferrarini, José M. Garrido Garcia, K. Hopt, Alain Pietrancosta, Katharina Pistor, Rolf Skog, S. Sołtysiński, J. Winter, E. Wymeersch
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引用次数: 3

摘要

本文包含欧洲公司法专家对欧盟委员会2012年6月28日关于2004年收购投标指令的适用和宣布的改革举措的报告的回应。为了评估这些举措,强制性投标规则的基本原理是相关的(退出理由、控制溢价理由和未扭曲的选择理由)。在此基础上,本文讨论了欧盟委员会提出的每个问题:1)“一致行动”的概念:ECLE认为,由于这些指令的目标不同,收购出价指令、透明度指令和收购指令的统一概念是没有用的。至于《收购指示》,应明确指出,投资者的联合参与活动不应引发强制性要约。2)各国对强制性要约规则的减损差异很大,但不同类型的减损引起了不同的关注。欧洲经委会建议,该指令应规定关于国家减损的审查程序。3) ECLE认为,有充分的理由填补漏洞,防止“潜入”和“潜入”收购。4)关于董事会中立性和突破规则,ECLE认为应该改变默认规则。选择权应该给股东,而不是给成员国。互惠原则是有缺陷的。5)雇员权利的保护应在更广泛的背景下加以解决,而不应专门针对一种类型的交易,如收购出价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Response to the European Commission's Report on the Application of the Takeover Bids Directive
This paper contains the European Company Law Experts' response to the report of the European Commission of 28 June 2012 on the application of the Takeover Bids Directive of 2004 and the reform initiatives announced. For evaluating these initiatives the rationale of the mandatory bid rule is relevant (exit rationale, control premium rationale and undistorted choice rationale). On this basis the paper discusses each of the concerns raised by the European Commission: 1) The concept of "acting in concert": The ECLE are of the opinion that a uniform concept for the Takeover Bids Directive, the Transparency Directive and the Acquisition Directive is not useful because of the different objectives of these Directives. As to the Takeover Directive it should be made clear that joint engagement activities of investors should not trigger a mandatory offer. 2) National derogations to the mandatory offer rule differ widely, but there are different types of derogations that pose different concerns. The ECLE recommend that the Directive should provide for a review process with respect to national derogations. 3) The ECLE believe that there are good reasons to close the loopholes against the “creep in” and the “creep on” acquisitions. 4) As to board neutrality and the break-through rule the ECLE believe that the default rules should be changed. The option rights should be given to the shareholders, not to the member states. The reciprocity rule is flawed. 5) The protection of the rights of employees should be addressed in a wider context and should not be taken up specifically for one type of transaction such as takeover bids.
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