水声系统中密码密钥生成的鲁棒信道参数

Konstantinos Pelekanakis, C. M. G. Gussen, R. Petroccia, J. Alves
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引用次数: 6

摘要

密钥管理是无线网络中密码系统成功运行的关键。基于非对称密钥的系统需要专用的密钥管理和认证基础设施,这对于自组织水声网络(UANs)可能不实用。在对称密钥系统中,当新节点加入网络时,密钥分配不容易处理。此外,当一个密钥被泄露时,使用同一密钥的所有节点都不再安全。因此,希望有一种动态的方式来生成新的密钥,而不依赖于过去的密钥。物理层安全(PLS)使用两个水下节点之间的相关信道测量来生成加密密钥,而无需交换密钥本身。在这项研究中,我们建立了一个由两个合法节点和一个窃听者组成的网络,该网络在葡萄牙海岸附近的一个浅水区运行。我们提出了基于已建立的声学链路的信道脉冲响应(CIR)的新特征,这些特征可以用作加密密钥生成算法的初始种子。结果表明,两个节点在交换187个探测信号后,可以独立产生306个量化比特。此外,即使窃听者执行与合法节点完全相同的信号处理步骤,也无法从他/她的数据中生成相同的比特。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Robust Channel Parameters for Crypto Key Generation in Underwater Acoustic Systems
Key management is critical for the successful operation of a cryptographic system in wireless networks. Systems based on asymmetric keys require a dedicated infrastructure for key management and authentication which may not be practical for ad-hoc Underwater Acoustic Networks (UANs). In symmetric-key systems, key distribution is not easy to handle when new nodes join the network. In addition, when a key is compromised all nodes that use the same key are not secure anymore. Hence, it is desirable to have a dynamic way to generate new keys without relying on past keys. Physical Layer Security (PLS) uses correlated channel measurements between two underwater nodes to generate a cryptographic key without exchanging the key itself. In this study, we set up a network of two legitimate nodes and one eavesdropper operating in a shallow area off the coast of Portugal. We propose novel features based on the Channel Impulse Response (CIR) of the established acoustic link that could be used as an initial seed for a crypto-key generation algorithm. Our results show that the two nodes can independently generate 306 quantization bits after exchanging 187 probe signals. Furthermore, the eavesdropper fails to generate the same bits from her/his data even if she/he performs exactly the same signal processing steps of the legitimate nodes.
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