从危机到机遇

A. Toprani
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本章对二战期间德国的石油战略进行了重新评估。德国早期战役(1939 - 1940年)的燃料消耗量低于预期,但对法国的迅速胜利使第三帝国陷入了两难境地。战前,欧洲三分之二的石油消费依靠进口。德国战前的努力只是为了实现自给自足——然而,第三帝国无法指望取代其他欧洲国家从海外进口的物资。德国规划者得出结论,除非德国控制了苏联或中东的石油资源,否则燃料短缺将很快破坏整个战争的努力。欧洲迫在眉睫的能源危机加强了希特勒在意识形态和战略上的信念,即德国应该在1941年冒着两线作战的风险,在美国干预之前进攻苏联。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
From Crisis to Opportunity
This chapter offers a reassessment of Germany’s oil strategy during World War II. Fuel consumption during Germany’s early campaigns (1939–40) was lower than expected, but the swift victory over France left the Third Reich in a quandary. Before the war, Europe had imported two-thirds of its petroleum consumption. Germany’s prewar efforts had only aimed to make it self-sufficient—the Third Reich could not hope, however, to replace the supplies other European nations had imported from overseas. German planners concluded that unless Germany took control of the oil resources of either the Soviet Union or the Middle East, fuel shortages would soon derail the entire war effort. This looming energy crisis in Europe strengthened Hitler’s ideological and strategic conviction that Germany should risk a two-front war in 1941 by attacking the Soviet Union before the United States could intervene.
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