{"title":"用状态行为监测检测基于web的间谍软件入侵","authors":"Ming-Wei Wu, S. Kuo","doi":"10.1109/PRDC.2007.41","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Spyware infection that exploits the vulnerabilities of client-side Web application, especially browser, to install malicious programs has gain significant popularity in recent years. Unlike traditional infection vectors such as software bundling in shareware/freeware and placing Trojan in pirated version of commercial software that generally requires user consent to be successfully installed, Web-based spyware attempts exploits on browser vulnerabilities to achieve automatic installation (a.k.a. drive-by download). In this paper, we characterize the behavior of spyware instances collected from software bundling and of those collected from exploit Web pages in terms of auto-start extensibility points (ASEP) and other spyware behaviors. We use a tool called STARS (Stateful Threat-Aware Removal System) that can monitor critical areas of the system and detect advanced feature of a spyware instance such as self- healing. Experimental results show that traditional spyware and Web-based spyware used a different combination set of ASEP to resist deletion. The latter one hooks to low-level system components and loaded as services and/or drivers employing Layered Service Provider (LSP) to interpret network traffic. Our observations identify the unique behaviors performed by the Web-based spyware that are rarely found on traditional spyware.","PeriodicalId":183540,"journal":{"name":"13th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC 2007)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Examining Web-Based Spyware Invasion with Stateful Behavior Monitoring\",\"authors\":\"Ming-Wei Wu, S. Kuo\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/PRDC.2007.41\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Spyware infection that exploits the vulnerabilities of client-side Web application, especially browser, to install malicious programs has gain significant popularity in recent years. Unlike traditional infection vectors such as software bundling in shareware/freeware and placing Trojan in pirated version of commercial software that generally requires user consent to be successfully installed, Web-based spyware attempts exploits on browser vulnerabilities to achieve automatic installation (a.k.a. drive-by download). In this paper, we characterize the behavior of spyware instances collected from software bundling and of those collected from exploit Web pages in terms of auto-start extensibility points (ASEP) and other spyware behaviors. We use a tool called STARS (Stateful Threat-Aware Removal System) that can monitor critical areas of the system and detect advanced feature of a spyware instance such as self- healing. Experimental results show that traditional spyware and Web-based spyware used a different combination set of ASEP to resist deletion. The latter one hooks to low-level system components and loaded as services and/or drivers employing Layered Service Provider (LSP) to interpret network traffic. Our observations identify the unique behaviors performed by the Web-based spyware that are rarely found on traditional spyware.\",\"PeriodicalId\":183540,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"13th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC 2007)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-12-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"13th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC 2007)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/PRDC.2007.41\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"13th Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing (PRDC 2007)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/PRDC.2007.41","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Examining Web-Based Spyware Invasion with Stateful Behavior Monitoring
Spyware infection that exploits the vulnerabilities of client-side Web application, especially browser, to install malicious programs has gain significant popularity in recent years. Unlike traditional infection vectors such as software bundling in shareware/freeware and placing Trojan in pirated version of commercial software that generally requires user consent to be successfully installed, Web-based spyware attempts exploits on browser vulnerabilities to achieve automatic installation (a.k.a. drive-by download). In this paper, we characterize the behavior of spyware instances collected from software bundling and of those collected from exploit Web pages in terms of auto-start extensibility points (ASEP) and other spyware behaviors. We use a tool called STARS (Stateful Threat-Aware Removal System) that can monitor critical areas of the system and detect advanced feature of a spyware instance such as self- healing. Experimental results show that traditional spyware and Web-based spyware used a different combination set of ASEP to resist deletion. The latter one hooks to low-level system components and loaded as services and/or drivers employing Layered Service Provider (LSP) to interpret network traffic. Our observations identify the unique behaviors performed by the Web-based spyware that are rarely found on traditional spyware.