机构持股对股利政策的影响:来自指数阈值的证据

Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets eJournal Pub Date : 2014-03-31 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2102822

Alan D. Crane, S. Michenaud, J. Weston

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引用次数: 311

摘要

我们表明，更高的机构所有权导致公司支付更多的股息。我们的识别依赖于罗素指数阈值附近所有权的不连续性。我们的估计表明，机构持股每增加一个百分点，股息就会增加700万美元(8%)。我们还发现，股东提案和投票模式的差异表明，即使是非激进机构也在监督公司行为方面发挥着重要作用。对于预期代理成本较高的公司，机构所有权对股息的影响更强。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Payout Policy: Evidence from Index Thresholds

We show that higher institutional ownership causes firms to pay more dividends. Our identification relies on a discontinuity in ownership around Russell index thresholds. Our estimates indicate that a one-percentage-point increase in institutional ownership causes a $7 million (8%) increase in dividends. We also find differences in shareholder proposals and voting patterns that suggest that even nonactivist institutions play an important role in monitoring firm behavior. The effect of institutional ownership on dividends is stronger for firms with higher expected agency costs.

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来源期刊

Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Financial Markets eJournal

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