北电的公司治理-重新审视董事会职能

P. Vasudev
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引用次数: 1

摘要

目前公司治理理论的模式是基于CEO和高管团队的管理,董事负责监督和监督。公司法支持这种模式,授权董事监督管理层,而不是自己管理公司。本文调查了失败的加拿大科技巨头北电网络(Nortel Networks)董事会的监督情况,以评估治理理论中关于监督的处方是否适当。本文结合北电的以下事件对董事会及其职能的假设进行了评估:ceo的流失和继任计划;企业收购策略;会计重述及调查;业务监督和破产申请。对董事会参与业务和战略的关注不足被认为是当前理论的一个缺陷。董事会将是陷入困境的公司的最后一道防线。北电的经验表明,董事会大多是独立的,仅具备监督职能,可能不足以作为普遍原则,尤其是在陷入困境、表现不佳的公司。在一家面临领导层不稳定和业务挑战、需要重新制定中长期战略的公司中,独立董事及其监督职能的问题将尤为突出。这种性质的情况说明了董事会如何通过更多地参与商业战略并在必要时更积极主动地为公司及其利益相关者提供更好的服务。文章建议成立一个新的董事会委员会来处理业务和战略问题。该委员会将不断监督公司企业的业务,并参与战略制定。通过这样做,董事会可以帮助确保一个盈利的企业是商业上健全和可持续的。该提案基于目前的董事会委员会制度,并解决了董事会对业务和战略的责任——这是一个在现行框架中受到有限关注的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Corporate Governance at Nortel – Revisiting Board Functions
The current model in corporate governance theory is predicated on management by CEO and a team of executives, with directors in charge of oversight and monitoring. Corporate law endorses this model by authorizing directors to supervise management, rather than manage corporations by themselves. This article surveys board oversight at Nortel Networks, the failed Canadian technology giant, to assess the adequacy of the prescription about monitoring in governance theory. The hypothesis about boards and their functions are evaluated with reference to the following events at Nortel: Churn in CEOs and succession planning; Business acquisitions strategy; Accounting restatements and investigation; Business oversight and bankruptcy filing.Insufficient attention to board engagement with business and strategy is identified as a shortcoming in current theory. Boards would be the last line of defence in troubled companies. The Nortel experience suggests that boards that are mostly independent and the bare monitoring function might not be adequate as universal principles, particularly in troubled, under-performing companies. The issue with independent directors and their function as monitors would be especially acute in a corporation facing leadership instability and business challenges, and is in need of re-strategizing for the medium and long term. Situations of this nature illustrate how boards can better serve corporations and their stakeholders through greater engagement with business strategy and being more proactive as necessary.The article proposes the creation of a new board committee to deal with business and strategy. This committee will constantly monitor the business of the corporate enterprise and participate in strategy development. By doing so, boards can contribute to assuring a profitable enterprise that is commercially sound and sustainable. The proposal is based on the current system of board committees and it addresses board responsibility for business and strategy – an issue that receives limited attention in the prevailing framework.
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