升级你的Android,升级我的恶意软件:通过移动操作系统升级的权限升级

Luyi Xing, Xiaorui Pan, Rui Wang, Kan Yuan, Xiaofeng Wang
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引用次数: 114

摘要

Android是一个快速发展的系统,不断推出新的更新。这些更新通常会彻底改变一个正在运行的系统,在关键用户数据和应用程序(简称应用程序)存在的情况下,在Android复杂的架构中替换和添加数万个文件。为了避免意外损坏这些数据和现有的应用程序,升级过程涉及复杂的程序逻辑,但其安全影响鲜为人知。本文首次系统地研究了Android的更新机制,重点研究了其包管理服务(Package Management Service, PMS)。我们的研究揭示了一种新型的安全关键漏洞,称为“堆积漏洞”(Pileup flaws),通过这种漏洞,恶意应用程序可以在低版本操作系统(OS)上策略性地声明一组特权和属性,并等待升级后在新系统上升级其特权。具体而言,我们发现,通过利用Pileup漏洞,该应用不仅可以获取一组新增的系统和签名权限,还可以确定其设置(如保护级别),并进一步替代新系统应用,污染其数据(如Android默认浏览器的缓存、cookie),窃取敏感用户信息或更改安全配置,阻止关键系统服务的安装。我们使用程序验证工具系统地分析了PMS的源代码,并在所有Android官方版本和3000多个定制版本中确认存在这些安全漏洞。我们的研究还发现了数百个攻击机会,攻击者可以利用不同设备制造商、运营商和国家的数千台设备。为了在升级过程中不危及用户数据和应用程序的情况下减轻这种威胁,我们还开发了一种新的检测服务,称为SecUP,它在用户的设备上部署了一个扫描仪,根据从新发布的Android操作系统映像中自动收集的漏洞相关信息,捕捉旨在利用堆积漏洞的恶意应用程序。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Upgrading Your Android, Elevating My Malware: Privilege Escalation through Mobile OS Updating
Android is a fast evolving system, with new updates coming out one after another. These updates often completely overhaul a running system, replacing and adding tens of thousands of files across Android's complex architecture, in the presence of critical user data and applications (apps for short). To avoid accidental damages to such data and existing apps, the upgrade process involves complicated program logic, whose security implications, however, are less known. In this paper, we report the first systematic study on the Android updating mechanism, focusing on its Package Management Service (PMS). Our research brought to light a new type of security-critical vulnerabilities, called Pileup flaws, through which a malicious app can strategically declare a set of privileges and attributes on a low-version operating system (OS) and wait until it is upgraded to escalate its privileges on the new system. Specifically, we found that by exploiting the Pileup vulnerabilities, the app can not only acquire a set of newly added system and signature permissions but also determine their settings (e.g., protection levels), and it can further substitute for new system apps, contaminate their data (e.g., cache, cookies of Android default browser) to steal sensitive user information or change security configurations, and prevent installation of critical system services. We systematically analyzed the source code of PMS using a program verification tool and confirmed the presence of those security flaws on all Android official versions and over 3000 customized versions. Our research also identified hundreds of exploit opportunities the adversary can leverage over thousands of devices across different device manufacturers, carriers and countries. To mitigate this threat without endangering user data and apps during an upgrade, we also developed a new detection service, called SecUP, which deploys a scanner on the user's device to capture the malicious apps designed to exploit Pileup vulnerabilities, based upon the vulnerability-related information automatically collected from newly released Android OS images.
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