关键基础设施防护的5G威胁场景建模

G. Holtrup, William Blonay, Martin Strohmeier, Alain Mermoud, Jean-Pascal Chavanne, Vincent Lenders
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引用次数: 0

摘要

目前,全球移动运营商正在部署第五代蜂窝网络(5G)。5G是许多用例的推动者,并且比4G和前几代网络提高了安全性和隐私性。然而,正如最近的安全研究显示的那样,5G标准仍然存在技术安全漏洞,可供攻击者利用。此外,从4G到5G系统的迁移是通过首先以非独立(NSA)方式部署5G解决方案来实现的,其中5G部署的第一步仅限于5G的新无线电方面。同时,对用户设备的控制仍基于4G协议;也就是说,核心网络仍然是传统的4G演进分组核心(EPC)网络。因此,在目前的5G部署中,4G网络的许多安全漏洞仍然存在。为了激发对当前5G网络安全风险的讨论,特别是在关键基础设施方面,我们根据STRIDE威胁分类模型对可能的威胁进行建模。我们根据影响无线接入和网络核心的11种威胁情景(TS)的可能性和影响推导出风险矩阵。我们估计,5G基站上的恶意软件或软件漏洞构成了最具影响力的威胁场景,尽管不是最可能的。相比之下,被泄露的加密密钥威胁网络功能之间通信的情况是极有可能的,而且影响很大。为了改善5G安全态势,我们讨论了可能的缓解措施和安全控制措施。我们的分析具有概括性,不依赖于任何特定5G网络供应商或运营商的具体情况。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Modeling 5G Threat Scenarios for Critical Infrastructure Protection
Fifth-generation cellular networks (5G) are currently being deployed by mobile operators around the globe. 5G is an enabler for many use cases and improves security and privacy over 4G and previous network generations. However, as recent security research has revealed, the 5G standard still has technical security weaknesses for attackers to exploit. In addition, the migration from 4G to 5G systems takes place by first deploying 5G solutions in a non-standalone (NSA) manner, where the first step of the 5G deployment is restricted to the new radio aspects of 5G. At the same time, the control of user equipment is still based on 4G protocols; that is, the core network is still the legacy 4G evolved packet core (EPC) network. As a result, many security vulnerabilities of 4G networks are still present in current 5G deployments. To stimulate the discussion about the security risks in current 5G networks, particularly regarding critical infrastructures, we model possible threats according to the STRIDE threat classification model. We derive a risk matrix based on the likelihood and impact of eleven threat scenarios (TS) that affect the radio access and the network core. We estimate that malware or software vulnerabilities on the 5G base station constitute the most impactful threat scenario, though not the most probable. In contrast, a scenario where compromised cryptographic keys threaten communications between network functions is both highly probable and highly impactful. To improve the 5G security posture, we discuss possible mitigations and security controls. Our analysis is generalizable and does not depend on the specifics of any particular 5G network vendor or operator.
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