Pricing Decisions and Member Participation Conditions in the Platform Supply Chain with Seasonal Demand: A Game Theory-Based Analysis

In a platform supply chain containing an sharing platform, a retailer, and two upstream factories, we consider the sales of two substitutable products and the constraints on the participation of non-platform members in the game, construct a dynamic game model of the platform supply chain with demand fluctuations due to seasonal changes, and use the inverse induction method to derive the thresholds for the participation of the retailer and factories in the game and the optimal price of each member, analyze the pricing decisions and participation game process among members. Our findings are as follows. (1) The threshold for the retailer to participate in the game during peak season is greater than that in the off-season, while the manufacturer's threshold is the opposite. (2) The platform should reduce commissions during peak season, factories should reduce wholesale prices, and the retailer should increase sales price. (3) The increase in price sensitivity coefficient, inventory cost and production cost are all detrimental to the platform, whereas an increase in the cross-price sensitivity coefficient is usually beneficial. (4) Whether it is the peak season or the off-season, the increase in demand fluctuations is bad for all chain members.