{"title":"新政府,同样的挑战","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0037","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"President Obama came to the office in 2009 with the promise of ending the Iraq war. Such reluctance to be committed to the war had already diminished U.S. leverage in the previous years and continued to do so. At the same time, the Iraqi government’s sectarianism and corruption undermined the prospects of a successful transition. The U.S. did not use its opportunities to push Maliki to reform the government. By mid-2014, a new Sunni Arab insurgency was flourishing.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"New Administration, Similar Challenges\",\"authors\":\"Christopher D. Kolenda\",\"doi\":\"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0037\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"President Obama came to the office in 2009 with the promise of ending the Iraq war. Such reluctance to be committed to the war had already diminished U.S. leverage in the previous years and continued to do so. At the same time, the Iraqi government’s sectarianism and corruption undermined the prospects of a successful transition. The U.S. did not use its opportunities to push Maliki to reform the government. By mid-2014, a new Sunni Arab insurgency was flourishing.\",\"PeriodicalId\":235305,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Zero-Sum Victory\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Zero-Sum Victory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0037\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Zero-Sum Victory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0037","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
President Obama came to the office in 2009 with the promise of ending the Iraq war. Such reluctance to be committed to the war had already diminished U.S. leverage in the previous years and continued to do so. At the same time, the Iraqi government’s sectarianism and corruption undermined the prospects of a successful transition. The U.S. did not use its opportunities to push Maliki to reform the government. By mid-2014, a new Sunni Arab insurgency was flourishing.