{"title":"“集体普京”政治与任人唯亲","authors":"A. Baturo, Johan A. Elkink","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192896193.003.0003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the patronage pillar of regime personalisation, determined by the strength of the ruler's patronage network, “Collective Putin.” It charts how Vladimir Putin's patron-client network developed and acquired control across institutions. It introduces original data on patron-client networks in Russia and maps these networks over time. Based on expert surveys of policy influence, it further explains how Putin's patron-client network has grown in dominance over time. The chapter finds that the path toward personalisation in Russia centred on the relatively swift acquisition of control over security and enforcement institutions, but a much more gradual penetration of other institutions by the ruler's network. It also finds that within the ranks of the Russian ruling coalition, this network emerges as dominant in early 2007, which also permitted Vladimir Putin to govern the regime from the subordinate position of prime minister from 2008--12. The patron-client network had further consolidated in strength and scope by 2012. Furthermore, Putin's return to presidential office, which coincided with the strengthening of personalisation on other pillars, made him largely autonomous from his own coalition. As the Russian leader has remained unchallenged in office for a considerable period of time, loyalty to the ruler no longer depended on whether officials had personal ties and belonged to the ruler's patronage network. Instead, loyalty came to be determined by the logic of a personalist system so that all officials regarded the ruler as their overall patron.","PeriodicalId":118662,"journal":{"name":"The New Kremlinology","volume":"442 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Politics of ‘Collective Putin’ and Patronage Personalization\",\"authors\":\"A. Baturo, Johan A. Elkink\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780192896193.003.0003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter examines the patronage pillar of regime personalisation, determined by the strength of the ruler's patronage network, “Collective Putin.” It charts how Vladimir Putin's patron-client network developed and acquired control across institutions. It introduces original data on patron-client networks in Russia and maps these networks over time. Based on expert surveys of policy influence, it further explains how Putin's patron-client network has grown in dominance over time. The chapter finds that the path toward personalisation in Russia centred on the relatively swift acquisition of control over security and enforcement institutions, but a much more gradual penetration of other institutions by the ruler's network. It also finds that within the ranks of the Russian ruling coalition, this network emerges as dominant in early 2007, which also permitted Vladimir Putin to govern the regime from the subordinate position of prime minister from 2008--12. The patron-client network had further consolidated in strength and scope by 2012. Furthermore, Putin's return to presidential office, which coincided with the strengthening of personalisation on other pillars, made him largely autonomous from his own coalition. As the Russian leader has remained unchallenged in office for a considerable period of time, loyalty to the ruler no longer depended on whether officials had personal ties and belonged to the ruler's patronage network. Instead, loyalty came to be determined by the logic of a personalist system so that all officials regarded the ruler as their overall patron.\",\"PeriodicalId\":118662,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The New Kremlinology\",\"volume\":\"442 2\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The New Kremlinology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896193.003.0003\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The New Kremlinology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192896193.003.0003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Politics of ‘Collective Putin’ and Patronage Personalization
This chapter examines the patronage pillar of regime personalisation, determined by the strength of the ruler's patronage network, “Collective Putin.” It charts how Vladimir Putin's patron-client network developed and acquired control across institutions. It introduces original data on patron-client networks in Russia and maps these networks over time. Based on expert surveys of policy influence, it further explains how Putin's patron-client network has grown in dominance over time. The chapter finds that the path toward personalisation in Russia centred on the relatively swift acquisition of control over security and enforcement institutions, but a much more gradual penetration of other institutions by the ruler's network. It also finds that within the ranks of the Russian ruling coalition, this network emerges as dominant in early 2007, which also permitted Vladimir Putin to govern the regime from the subordinate position of prime minister from 2008--12. The patron-client network had further consolidated in strength and scope by 2012. Furthermore, Putin's return to presidential office, which coincided with the strengthening of personalisation on other pillars, made him largely autonomous from his own coalition. As the Russian leader has remained unchallenged in office for a considerable period of time, loyalty to the ruler no longer depended on whether officials had personal ties and belonged to the ruler's patronage network. Instead, loyalty came to be determined by the logic of a personalist system so that all officials regarded the ruler as their overall patron.