道德风险下人力资源派遣激励机制分析

Yanli Yang, Xian Wang
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摘要

随着市场竞争的加剧,人力派遣服务可以降低企业的人力资源成本。但是,委托方、派遣单位和被派遣劳动者之间的信息不对称可能会造成派遣单位和被派遣劳动者的道德风险。本文考虑信息不对称条件下的道德风险问题。研究了在考虑派遣单位和被派遣工人激励相容约束下委托人利润最大化问题。通过模型分析,委托委托方可以调整激励系数,以更好地激励派遣机构和被派遣工人,从而使请求方获得更多的收益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Analysis on Incentive Mechanism of Human Resources Dispatching under Moral Hazard
With the increasing of market competition, human dispatching service can reduce enterprise's human resources cost. But asymmetric information among principal, dispatching agency and dispatched workers may cause moral hazard of dispatching agency and dispatched workers. This paper considers moral hazard under asymmetric information. It researches the maximum problem of principal's profit under the incentive compatibility constraints of considering dispatching agency and dispatched workers. Through model analysis it commissioned that principal can adjust the incentive coefficient in order to better motivate dispatching agency and dispatched workers, so that the requester to obtain more revenue.
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