药品专利执法:一个发展的视角

Shamnad Basheer, Jay Sanklecha, Prakruthi Gowda
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引用次数: 2

摘要

虽然知识产权的授予标准经常在知识产权和发展的文献中占据中心位置,但知识产权的执行在很大程度上被忽视了。本文试图通过关注专利侵权诉讼中授予禁令的标准来填补这一空白,尽管在一定程度上是有限的。这一点尤其重要,因为许多发展中国家,如印度,正面临着迅速增长的专利纠纷,这些纠纷对创新的未来和获得专利商品(特别是药品)的问题具有巨大影响。鉴于在许多情况下,临时禁令在很大程度上决定了知识产权纠纷,本章主要侧重于此类禁令。颁发禁制令的标准应适当地平衡专利权人的利益(确保其权利得到及时有效的执行)和防止错误禁制令的公众利益(即专利在审判后被证明无效或未被侵犯)。这种错误授予的禁令不仅损害了被授予禁令的竞争者,也损害了在禁令/限制令存续期间被迫支付垄断价格的消费者。我们建议,当面临复杂的专利纠纷时,很难在中间阶段合法地评估每一方的案件实力,并有效地预测谁更有可能在审判中获胜,法院直接进入审判阶段——这一建议将越来越多地被印度最高法院采用。我们认为,这是《与贸易有关的知识产权协定》的灵活性,发展中国家,如印度,可以合法地加以利用。我们还强调了机构能力的问题,并提出这样的问题:像印度这样的发展中国家是否应该设立专门的知识产权法庭来裁决专利侵权诉讼?这是否会带来更理想的知识产权裁决?虽然是针对印度的,但本章中的大多数建议可能对许多其他发展中国家有用,特别是那些遵循普通法并且尚未经历大量专利侵权案件的国家。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Pharmaceutical Patent Enforcement: A Developmental Perspective
Although standards for the grant of intellectual property rights often take center stage in the literature on intellectual property and development, intellectual property enforcement is largely ignored. This paper seeks to fill this gap, albeit to a limited extent, by focusing on the standards for the grant of injunctions in patent infringement suits.This is particularly relevant, as a number of developing countries, such as India, are faced with burgeoning patent disputes disputes that have enormous implications for the future of innovation and the issue of access to patented goods, notably pharmaceuticals. Given that interim injunctions are largely dispositive of intellectual property disputes in many cases, this chapter focuses largely on such injunctions.The standards for the grant of injunctions ought to be calibrated in a manner that appropriately balances the interests of the patentee in securing timely and effective enforcement of her rights with the public interest in guarding against erroneous injunctions (i.e. where the patent turns out to be invalid or not infringed after trial). Such wrongly granted injunctions harm not only competitors against whom they are granted, but also consumers who are forced to pay a monopoly price during the subsistence of the injunction/restraining order.We recommend that, when faced with a complex patent dispute where it is difficult to legitimately assess the strength of each party’s case at the interim stage and effectively predict who is more likely to win at trial, courts move directly to the trial stage - a suggestion that is coming to be increasingly adopted by the Indian Supreme Court. We argue that this is a TRIPS flexibility that developing countries, such as India, can legitimately exploit. We also highlight issues of institutional capacity and ask: Should developing countries such as India institute specialist intellectual property courts to decide patent infringement suits? Would this make for more optimal intellectual property adjudication? Though specific to India, most of the suggestions in this chapter could prove useful for a number of other developing countries, particularly those that follow common law and are yet to experience a significant number of patent infringement cases.
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