Acting and Believing Well

Chapter 10 introduces and elaborates on the deliberative role for reasons, and lays out the Fundamental Argument for Reasons First. It is shown that the fact that reasons can be acted on played very little role in any of the main arguments in Chapters 3 through 9, and argued that this means that it is possible to apply yet more leverage in order to show that reasons have analytic and explanatory priority. It is argued that deontic properties such as being the right thing to do, permissible, rational, obligatory, advisable, and the like each come with the corresponding well property of not only doing the right thing, but doing it well. The fact that reasons can be acted on is especially important, it is argued, when it comes to understanding the relationship between right properties and their corresponding well properties. The Fundamental Argument for Reasons First seeks to show that we must appeal to reasons in our analysis and explanation of right properties in order for them to result in corresponding well properties in a way that is non-recursive.