抵押品、风险管理和债务能力的分配

A. Rampini, S. Viswanathan, A. Dasgupta, Douglas W. Diamond, E. Farhi, Alexander Gümbel, Yaron Leitner, Christine A. Parlour, Guillaume Plantin, D. Scharfstein, David Skeie, René M. Stulz
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引用次数: 448

摘要

抵押品限制意味着融资和风险管理在根本上是联系在一起的。从事风险管理和保留债务能力以对冲未来融资需求的机会成本是放弃当前投资,对于生产率较高和资本不足的公司来说,机会成本更高。更受约束的公司从事较少的风险管理,并可能耗尽其债务能力和放弃风险管理,与经验证据一致,并与接受的理论形成对比。当现金流较低时,这些公司可能无法抓住投资机会并被迫缩小规模。因此,在经济低迷时期,资本的配置效率可能会降低。版权所有2010年美国金融协会。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Collateral, Risk Management, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity
Collateral constraints imply that financing and risk management are fundamentally linked. The opportunity cost of engaging in risk management and conserving debt capacity to hedge future financing needs is forgone current investment, and is higher for more productive and less well-capitalized firms. More constrained firms engage in less risk management and may exhaust their debt capacity and abstain from risk management, consistent with empirical evidence and in contrast to received theory. When cash flows are low, such firms may be unable to seize investment opportunities and be forced to downsize. Consequently, capital may be less productively deployed in downturns. Copyright (c) 2010 the American Finance Association.
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