Semantics of Non-Doxastic Attitude Ascriptions from Experimental Perspective

The paper presents novel experimental data regarding reports of non-doxastic attitudes (expressed by verbs such as “wants”, “fear”, “is glad”, and etc.) As observed by some theorists, non-doxastic attitude ascriptions differ from the ascriptions of doxastic attitudes (e.g., “believes”) in that they do not support simple entailments or presuppositions of their complement clause. In particular, an ascription may intuitively change its truth-value if we alter the informational structure of the embedded clause without modifying its truth conditions. We present two experiments whose results support this observation. Experiment 1 shows that the truth-value and acceptability judgements of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions in a context generally depend on the informational structure of the embedded clause. Experiment 2 reveals that the truth-value judgements vary if we manipulate not only the “presupposition-assertion” structure of embedded clause, but also the components related to non-presuppositional entailments of the clause. This conclusion suggests that the contents on which attitude verbs operate should be represented as structured entities.