通过低开销混淆在基于fpga的系统中实现健壮的比特流保护

Robert Karam, Tamzidul Hoque, S. Ray, M. Tehranipoor, S. Bhunia
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引用次数: 33

摘要

现场可编程门阵列(fpga)等可重构硬件正越来越多地部署在各种应用领域,包括汽车系统、关键基础设施和新兴的物联网(IoT),以实现定制设计。然而,保护基于fpga的设计免受盗版,逆向工程和篡改是具有挑战性的,特别是对于需要远程升级的系统。在许多情况下,基于位流加密的现有解决方案可能无法提供足够的保护以抵御这些攻击。在本文中,我们提出了一种新的混淆方法,用于在低开销下对FPGA比特流进行可证明的鲁棒保护,远远超出了比特流加密所提供的保护。该方法适用于现有的FPGA架构和合成流程,可以与加密技术一起使用,也可以单独用于功率和面积受限的系统。它利用“FPGA暗硅”——可配置逻辑块中未使用的资源——有效地混淆了真正的功能。我们为该方法提供了详细的威胁模型和安全分析。我们已经开发了一个完整的应用程序映射框架,集成了Altera Quartus II软件。使用该CAD框架,我们实现了可证明的强大安全性,可以抵御FPGA比特流的所有主要攻击,一组基准电路的平均延迟为13%,总功耗开销为2%,以及商用FPGA上的几个大规模开源IP块。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Robust bitstream protection in FPGA-based systems through low-overhead obfuscation
Reconfigurable hardware, such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), are being increasingly deployed in diverse application areas including automotive systems, critical infrastructures, and the emerging Internet of Things (IoT), to implement customized designs. However, securing FPGA-based designs against piracy, reverse engineering, and tampering is challenging, especially for systems that require remote upgrade. In many cases, existing solutions based on bit-stream encryption may not provide sufficient protection against these attacks. In this paper, we present a novel obfuscation approach for provably robust protection of FPGA bitstreams at low overhead that goes well beyond the protection offered by bitstream encryption. The approach works with existing FPGA architectures and synthesis flows, and can be used with encryption techniques, or by itself for power and area-constrained systems. It leverages “FPGA dark silicon” — unused resources within the configurable logic blocks — to efficiently obfuscate the true functionality. We provide a detailed threat model and security analysis for the approach. We have developed a complete application mapping framework that integrates with the Altera Quartus II software. Using this CAD framework, we achieve provably strong security against all major attacks on FPGA bitstreams with an average 13% latency and 2% total power overhead for a set of benchmark circuits, as well as several large-scale open-source IP blocks on commercial FPGA.
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