并购交易:来自公司债券的证据

Simi Kedia, Xing (Alex) Zhou
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引用次数: 75

摘要

本文考察了收购公告前公司债券知情交易的普遍程度。我们发现显著的公告前交易活动和目标债券的价格变动,方向与待决信息的性质一致。通过实施交易报告和合规引擎(TRACE)系统,提高了债券市场的透明度,减少了知情交易的发生。此外,有一些微弱的证据表明,与并购顾问公司有关联的经销商在预期负面消息的情况下出售股票,这表明可能存在信息泄露的渠道。这些负面消息被纳入债券价格的速度似乎并不比纳入目标股的速度慢。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Informed Trading around Acquisitions: Evidence from Corporate Bonds
This paper examines the prevalence of informed trading in corporate bonds prior to takeover announcements. We find significant pre-announcement trading activities and price movements in target bonds, in directions consistent with the nature of pending information. Improved transparency in the bond markets achieved by the implementation of the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system reduces the incidence of informed trading. Further, there is some weak evidence that dealers affiliated with merger and acquisition advisors sell in anticipation of negative news, pointing to a possible channel of information leakage. Such negative news seems to be incorporated into bond prices no slower than into the target stocks.
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