虚拟化环境下内存重复数据删除的安全问题

Jidong Xiao, Zhang Xu, Hai Huang, Haining Wang
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引用次数: 64

摘要

内存重复数据删除已广泛用于各种商用管理程序。通过合并相同的内存内容,它允许更多的虚拟机并发地运行在一个管理程序之上。然而,虽然这种技术提高了内存效率,但它对系统安全性有很大的影响。特别是,内存重复数据删除通常使用写时复制(copy-on-write)技术的一种变体来实现,在这种技术中,写入共享页面会比非共享页面产生更长的访问时间。在本文中,我们从攻击者和防御者的角度研究了内存重复删除的安全含义。一方面,使用上面的构件,我们演示了两种新的攻击,分别用于创建隐蔽通道和检测虚拟化。另一方面,我们还展示了可以利用内存重复数据删除来保护Linux内核的完整性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Security implications of memory deduplication in a virtualized environment
Memory deduplication has been widely used in various commodity hypervisors. By merging identical memory contents, it allows more virtual machines to run concurrently on top of a hypervisor. However, while this technique improves memory efficiency, it has a large impact on system security. In particular, memory deduplication is usually implemented using a variant of copy-on-write techniques, for which, writing to a shared page would incur a longer access time than those non-shared. In this paper, we investigate the security implication of memory deduplication from the perspectives of both attackers and defenders. On one hand, using the artifact above, we demonstrate two new attacks to create a covert channel and detect virtualization, respectively. On the other hand, we also show that memory deduplication can be leveraged to safeguard Linux kernel integrity.
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