公司诉讼领域的领导市场

J. Erickson
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引用次数: 5

摘要

长期以来,传统观点认为,公司诉讼中的领导决策最好留给律师。即使公司诉讼的世界发生了巨大的变化,法院一直依靠律师自己来决定他们中的谁将控制诉讼判决。因此,公司诉讼中的领导层决定几乎总是在私下谈判和幕后交易中做出的。本文揭开了这些决策的面纱,使用实证数据对公司诉讼中的领导地位进行了首次深入研究。这种审视揭示了一个与法院和评论员所想象的理想市场几乎没有相似之处。对私人订货的依赖迫使律师们同意过于复杂的领导结构。这些结构反过来又导致律师在诉讼上的投资不足,鼓励了谈判桌上的拖延和机会主义。事情本不必如此。其他类型的复杂诉讼,从小规模的消费者集体诉讼到多地区证券集体诉讼,都成功地避免了这些问题。公司法是时候利用这些见解,为公司诉讼领域的领导者开拓一个新的市场了。说到底,领导力太重要了,不能留给律师。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Market for Leadership in Corporate Litigation
Conventional wisdom has long held that leadership decisions in corporate litigation are best left to the lawyers. Even as the world of corporate litigation has changed dramatically, courts have consistently relied on the lawyers themselves to decide who among them will control litigation decisions. As a result, leadership decisions in corporate litigation are almost always made in private negotiations and back-room deals. This Article pulls back the curtain on these decisions, using empirical data to conduct the first in-depth examination into the market for leadership in corporate litigation. This examination reveals a market that bears little resemblance to the ideal imagined by courts and commentators. The reliance on private ordering forces lawyers to agree to overly complicated leadership structures. These structures in turn cause lawyers to underinvest in litigation, encouraging hold-outs and opportunism at the negotiating table. It need not be this way. Other types of complex litigation, from small-scale consumer class actions to multi-district securities class actions, have successfully avoided such problems. The time has come for corporate law to draw on these insights and develop a new market for leadership in corporate litigation. In the end, leadership is far too important to be left to the lawyers.
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