{"title":"通过物理隔离保护飞地免受核心内侧信道攻击","authors":"Marno van der Maas, S. Moore","doi":"10.1145/3411505.3418437","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Systems that protect enclaves from privileged software must consider software-based side-channel attacks. Our system isolates enclaves on separate secure cores to stop attackers from running on the same core as the victim, which mitigates intra-core side-channel attacks. Redesigning the memory hierarchy based on enclave ownership protects enclaves against inter-core side-channel attacks. We implement this system and evaluate it in terms of communication performance, memory overhead and hardware area. Combining physical isolation and a redesigned memory hierarchy protects enclaves against all known software-based side-channel attacks.","PeriodicalId":157519,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Security Arms Race","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Protecting Enclaves from Intra-Core Side-Channel Attacks through Physical Isolation\",\"authors\":\"Marno van der Maas, S. Moore\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3411505.3418437\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Systems that protect enclaves from privileged software must consider software-based side-channel attacks. Our system isolates enclaves on separate secure cores to stop attackers from running on the same core as the victim, which mitigates intra-core side-channel attacks. Redesigning the memory hierarchy based on enclave ownership protects enclaves against inter-core side-channel attacks. We implement this system and evaluate it in terms of communication performance, memory overhead and hardware area. Combining physical isolation and a redesigned memory hierarchy protects enclaves against all known software-based side-channel attacks.\",\"PeriodicalId\":157519,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Security Arms Race\",\"volume\":\"54 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-11-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Security Arms Race\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3411505.3418437\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Cyber-Security Arms Race","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3411505.3418437","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Protecting Enclaves from Intra-Core Side-Channel Attacks through Physical Isolation
Systems that protect enclaves from privileged software must consider software-based side-channel attacks. Our system isolates enclaves on separate secure cores to stop attackers from running on the same core as the victim, which mitigates intra-core side-channel attacks. Redesigning the memory hierarchy based on enclave ownership protects enclaves against inter-core side-channel attacks. We implement this system and evaluate it in terms of communication performance, memory overhead and hardware area. Combining physical isolation and a redesigned memory hierarchy protects enclaves against all known software-based side-channel attacks.
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