比较情报问责制

C. Leuprecht
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章回顾了情报问责的文献,回顾了不同的理论,并向读者介绍了关键术语,如监督,审查,控制和治理。这本书补充了情报监督的过程——让isa负责的做法,isa必须证明他们的活动是合理的——与其他类型和级别的问责制。从类型学上讲,问责机构的不同之处在于它们用来对ISA问责的方式和方法:它们可以审查、监督或控制情报和安全机构(ISA),和/或接受和处理有关ISA行动或活动的投诉。虽然它们通常是评估情报界的合规性,但最近它们一直在履行其他职能,例如促进创新。不同类型的问责制由不同层次的情报和安全机构进行补充:内部、管理和外部。本章向读者介绍了情报问责制的制度架构:立法委员会、司法和准司法机构、官僚和行政机构以及行政监督。它接着审查了情报问责框架:法律、立法机构、行政部门、司法部门、媒体、公众、公民社会和民主利益。本章最后论述了国际和超国家问责合作的发展情况。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Comparing Intelligence Accountability
This chapter reviews the literature of intelligence accountability, reviews different theories, and introduces readers to key terms such as oversight, review, control, and governance. This book complements the process of intelligence oversight—the practice of holding ISAs to account, whereby ISAs have to justify their activities—with other types and levels of accountability. Typologically, accountability bodies differ by ways and methods they use to hold ISAs accountable: they can review, oversee, or control Intelligence and Security Agencies (ISA), and/or accept and address complaints concerning actions or activities of an ISA. Although conventionally they assessed compliance within an intelligence community, as of late they have been performing additional functions, such as promoting innovation. The different types of accountability are complemented by various layers in which Intelligence and Security Agencies are held accountable: internal, managerial, and external. The chapter introduces readers to the institutional architecture of intelligence accountability: legislative committees, judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, bureaucratic and administrative bodies, and executive oversight. It goes on to review intelligence accountability frameworks: laws, legislatures, the executive, the judiciary, the media, the public, civil society, and the democratic interest. The chapter closes on developments in international and supranational accountability cooperation.
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