ABS cdo在金融危机中的实际应用

Larry Cordell, G. Feldberg, Danielle Sass
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摘要

《结构金融杂志》2019年夏季号《ABS cdo在金融危机中的作用》一文的作者拉里·科德尔(费城联邦储备银行)、格雷格·费尔德伯格(耶鲁大学)和丹尼尔·萨斯(伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校)解释了资产支持证券抵押债务凭证(ABS cdo)的投资池在2000年代中期是如何变得越来越危险的。这些证券总共减记了4100亿美元,其中3250亿美元由AAA级和超高级证券承担。首批发行的ABS cdo投资于多种多样的证券组合。但在2005年至2007年间,新发行的ABS cdo主要由次级抵押贷款支持证券(mbs)提供支持,这些mbs由非优质抵押贷款和这些mbs的衍生品提供支持。金融公司相信这些单一的ABS cdo是超级安全的,但当次级抵押贷款市场崩溃时,它们遭受了巨大损失。作者解释了这种虚假安全感和巨大损失的原因。他们表示,金融危机的一个主要催化剂是监管机构允许企业积累的巨大杠杆,当它们的ABS cdo失败时,它们面临破产的危险。然后,作者考察了该行业是否吸取了教训。主题:资产支持证券,信用风险管理,金融危机和金融市场历史
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Practical Applications of The Role of ABS CDOs in the Financial Crisis
Practical Applications Summary In The Role of ABS CDOs in the Financial Crisis from the Summer 2019 issue of The Journal of Structured Finance, authors Larry Cordell (of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia), Greg Feldberg (of Yale University), and Danielle Sass (of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) explain how investment pools called asset-backed security collateralized debt obligations (ABS CDOs) became increasingly risky in the mid-2000s. The securities produced total writedowns of $410 billion, of which $325 billion were borne by AAA and super-senior securities. The first ABS CDOs ever issued were invested in a well-diversified mix of securities. But between 2005 and 2007, newly issued ABS CDOs were backed primarily by subordinate classes of MBSs backed by nonprime mortgage loans and derivatives of those MBSs. Financial firms believed these undiversified ABS CDOs were ultra-safe, but incurred massive losses when the subprime mortgage market collapsed. The authors explain the reasons for this false sense of security and the huge losses. They say a primary catalyst of the financial crisis was the enormous leverage that regulators had let firms build up, leaving them in danger of insolvency when their ABS CDOs failed. The authors then examine whether the industry has learned any lessons. TOPICS: Asset-backed securities (ABS), credit risk management, financial crises and financial market history
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