代理合同，非承诺时间策略和实物期权

IF 16.4 1区化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Accounts of Chemical Research Pub Date : 2017-03-27 DOI:10.1111/jere.12144

Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano

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引用次数: 0

摘要

考虑在管理者的隐性行为下，业主缺乏承诺其时机决策的能力，我们考虑了契约的最优设计和业主的最优时机决策。使用实物期权方法，我们表明，与完全承诺的情况相比，高(低)质量的项目比(与)第一最佳的情况更晚(同时)启动，而如果隐藏行动问题足够严重(不够严重)，则更换经理(不一定)更晚。遣散费可以将经理失去公司控制权的补偿降到最低。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options

Given that an owner lacks the ability to commit to his or her timing decisions under a manager's hidden action, we consider the optimal design of the contract and the owner's optimal timing decisions. Using a real options approach, we show that, compared with the full commitment case, a higher (lower)-quality project is launched later than (at the same time as) the first-best case, whereas the replacement of the manager is (is not necessarily) made later if the hidden-action problem is severe enough (is not severe enough). Severance pay may serve to minimize the compensation for the manager's loss of corporate control.

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来源期刊

Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合

CiteScore

31.40

自引率

1.10%

发文量

312

审稿时长

2 months

期刊介绍： Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.