Daniël Reijsbergen, Aung Maw, Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Wen-Tai Li, C. Yuen
{"title":"通过基于区块链的数据共享激励机制保护智能电网","authors":"Daniël Reijsbergen, Aung Maw, Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Wen-Tai Li, C. Yuen","doi":"10.1145/3508398.3511504","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Smart grids leverage the data collected from smart meters to make important operational decisions. However, they are vulnerable to False Data Injection (FDI) attacks in which an attacker manipulates meter data to disrupt the grid operations. Existing works on FDI are based on a simple threat model in which a single grid operator has access to all the data, and only some meters can be compromised. Our goal is to secure smart grids against FDI under a realistic threat model. To this end, we present a threat model in which there are multiple operators, each with a partial view of the grid, and each can be fully compromised. An effective defense against FDI in this setting is to share data between the operators. However, the main challenge here is to incentivize data sharing. We address this by proposing an incentive mechanism that rewards operators for uploading data, but penalizes them if the data is missing or anomalous. We derive formal conditions under which our incentive mechanism is provably secure against operators who withhold or distort measurement data for profit. We then implement the data sharing solution on a private blockchain, introducing several optimizations that overcome the inherent performance limitations of the blockchain. Finally, we conduct an experimental evaluation that demonstrates that our implementation has practical performance.","PeriodicalId":102306,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Securing Smart Grids Through an Incentive Mechanism for Blockchain-Based Data Sharing\",\"authors\":\"Daniël Reijsbergen, Aung Maw, Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Wen-Tai Li, C. Yuen\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3508398.3511504\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Smart grids leverage the data collected from smart meters to make important operational decisions. However, they are vulnerable to False Data Injection (FDI) attacks in which an attacker manipulates meter data to disrupt the grid operations. Existing works on FDI are based on a simple threat model in which a single grid operator has access to all the data, and only some meters can be compromised. Our goal is to secure smart grids against FDI under a realistic threat model. To this end, we present a threat model in which there are multiple operators, each with a partial view of the grid, and each can be fully compromised. An effective defense against FDI in this setting is to share data between the operators. However, the main challenge here is to incentivize data sharing. We address this by proposing an incentive mechanism that rewards operators for uploading data, but penalizes them if the data is missing or anomalous. We derive formal conditions under which our incentive mechanism is provably secure against operators who withhold or distort measurement data for profit. We then implement the data sharing solution on a private blockchain, introducing several optimizations that overcome the inherent performance limitations of the blockchain. Finally, we conduct an experimental evaluation that demonstrates that our implementation has practical performance.\",\"PeriodicalId\":102306,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-02-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3508398.3511504\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3508398.3511504","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Securing Smart Grids Through an Incentive Mechanism for Blockchain-Based Data Sharing
Smart grids leverage the data collected from smart meters to make important operational decisions. However, they are vulnerable to False Data Injection (FDI) attacks in which an attacker manipulates meter data to disrupt the grid operations. Existing works on FDI are based on a simple threat model in which a single grid operator has access to all the data, and only some meters can be compromised. Our goal is to secure smart grids against FDI under a realistic threat model. To this end, we present a threat model in which there are multiple operators, each with a partial view of the grid, and each can be fully compromised. An effective defense against FDI in this setting is to share data between the operators. However, the main challenge here is to incentivize data sharing. We address this by proposing an incentive mechanism that rewards operators for uploading data, but penalizes them if the data is missing or anomalous. We derive formal conditions under which our incentive mechanism is provably secure against operators who withhold or distort measurement data for profit. We then implement the data sharing solution on a private blockchain, introducing several optimizations that overcome the inherent performance limitations of the blockchain. Finally, we conduct an experimental evaluation that demonstrates that our implementation has practical performance.