Towards cyber-resilient telecontrol commands using software-defined networking

Cybersecurity enhancement of power systems has become one of the main objectives of utility managers and regulatory agencies because of the increasing number of cyberattacks against critical infrastructures. In this paper, we investigate the application of software-defined networking for improving the cyber-resilience of power systems in the presence of cyberattacks using false telecontrol commands. It is first demonstrated that cyberattackers can use false telecontrol commands to separate a power plant from a power grid or trip a major transmission line. Next, it is shown that software-defined networking can significantly enhance the cyber-resilience of power systems in the presence of cyberattacks using false telecontrol commands compared to legacy communication networks. This is because the source, destination and protocol of telecontrol commands can be examined and verified in software-defined networking before communication packet forwarding actions take place. Moreover, primary and back-up routes of telecontrol commands can be pre-engineered in software-defined networking to counteract potential cyberattacks.