薪酬话语权与股票表现之间的联系

Francesco Drigo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了公司薪酬话语权投票与股票市场价格变动之间的关系。虽然薪酬话语权投票是股东对公司高管薪酬计划的意见表达,但对管理层薪酬的投票通常可以表明股东对公司治理、战略和业绩的更广泛的满意程度。此外,经验数据表明,在薪酬话语权投票中失败的公司,在随后的12个月里,更有可能表现逊于其市场指数。从理论角度出发,本文旨在为薪酬话语权的中心性及其与公司价值的相关性这一课题做出贡献。从实际的角度来看,我们的研究结果可能有助于发行人和投资者识别警告信号
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The link between say-on-pay vote and share performance
This paper examines the relation between corporate voting on say-on-pay and variation of stock market pricing. While say-on-pay votes are the expression of shareholder views on company executives’ compensation plan, vote on management remuneration can often be indicative of shareholders’ broader level of satisfaction on governance, strategy, and performance. Further, empirical data indicate that companies that fail the say-on-pay vote are more likely to underperform their market index in the subsequent twelve months. From a theoretical point of view, this paper aims to make a contribution to the topic of the centrality of the say-on-pay and its correlation with company value. From a practical point of view, our findings may be beneficial in contributing to the identification of warning flags both for issuers and investors
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