A. Banerjee, Emily Breza, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, B. Golub
{"title":"当少即是多:印度废钞运动期间信息传递的实验证据","authors":"A. Banerjee, Emily Breza, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, B. Golub","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3163930","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n In disseminating information, policymakers face a choice between broadcasting to everyone and informing a small number of “seeds” who then spread the message. While broadcasting maximizes the initial reach of messages, we offer theoretical and experimental evidence that it need not be the best strategy. In a field experiment during the 2016 Indian demonetization, we delivered policy information, varying three dimensions of the delivery method at the village level: initial reach (broadcasting versus seeding); whether or not we induced common knowledge of who was initially informed; and number of facts delivered. We measured three outcomes: the volume of conversations about demonetization, knowledge of demonetization rules, and choice quality in a strongly incentivized policy-dependent decision. On all three outcomes, under common knowledge, seeding dominates broadcasting; moreover, adding common knowledge makes seeding more effective but broadcasting less so. We interpret our results via a model of image concerns deterring engagement in social learning, and support this interpretation with evidence on differential behavior across ability categories.","PeriodicalId":210701,"journal":{"name":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"53","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"When Less is More: Experimental Evidence on Information Delivery During India&Apos;S Demonetization\",\"authors\":\"A. Banerjee, Emily Breza, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, B. Golub\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3163930\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n In disseminating information, policymakers face a choice between broadcasting to everyone and informing a small number of “seeds” who then spread the message. While broadcasting maximizes the initial reach of messages, we offer theoretical and experimental evidence that it need not be the best strategy. In a field experiment during the 2016 Indian demonetization, we delivered policy information, varying three dimensions of the delivery method at the village level: initial reach (broadcasting versus seeding); whether or not we induced common knowledge of who was initially informed; and number of facts delivered. We measured three outcomes: the volume of conversations about demonetization, knowledge of demonetization rules, and choice quality in a strongly incentivized policy-dependent decision. On all three outcomes, under common knowledge, seeding dominates broadcasting; moreover, adding common knowledge makes seeding more effective but broadcasting less so. We interpret our results via a model of image concerns deterring engagement in social learning, and support this interpretation with evidence on differential behavior across ability categories.\",\"PeriodicalId\":210701,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"53\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3163930\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Decision-Making in Public Policy & the Social Good eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3163930","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
When Less is More: Experimental Evidence on Information Delivery During India&Apos;S Demonetization
In disseminating information, policymakers face a choice between broadcasting to everyone and informing a small number of “seeds” who then spread the message. While broadcasting maximizes the initial reach of messages, we offer theoretical and experimental evidence that it need not be the best strategy. In a field experiment during the 2016 Indian demonetization, we delivered policy information, varying three dimensions of the delivery method at the village level: initial reach (broadcasting versus seeding); whether or not we induced common knowledge of who was initially informed; and number of facts delivered. We measured three outcomes: the volume of conversations about demonetization, knowledge of demonetization rules, and choice quality in a strongly incentivized policy-dependent decision. On all three outcomes, under common knowledge, seeding dominates broadcasting; moreover, adding common knowledge makes seeding more effective but broadcasting less so. We interpret our results via a model of image concerns deterring engagement in social learning, and support this interpretation with evidence on differential behavior across ability categories.