Android手机上的后gdpr威胁搜索:剖析用户不可重置标识符的操作系统级安全措施

M. H. Meng, Qing Zhang, Guangshuai Xia, Yuwei Zheng, Yanjun Zhang, Guangdong Bai, Zhi Liu, S. Teo, J. Dong
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引用次数: 3

摘要

自诞生之日起,Android就使应用程序能够访问移动设备上的数据和服务。然而,这涉及到各种各样的用户不可重置标识符(uui),例如MAC地址,它与设备永久关联。考虑到他们的隐私敏感性,Android从10版开始收紧其UUI访问政策,以应对全球日益严格的隐私保护规定。非系统应用程序被限制访问它们,并要求使用用户可重置的替代品,如广告id。在这项工作中,我们对Android手机上UUI保护的有效性进行了系统的研究,包括Android开源项目(AOSP)和原始设备制造商(OEM)手机。为了便于我们的大规模研究,我们提出了一套发现和评估UUI访问通道的分析技术。我们的方法的特点是混合分析,包括Android框架的静态程序分析和操作系统映像的取证分析,以发现访问通道。然后用差异分析对这些渠道进行测试,以确定打开任何攻击机会的弱点。我们对9家主要制造商的13款流行手机进行了漏洞评估,其中大多数都是最畅销的,安装了最新的Android版本。我们的研究表明,UUI错误处理普遍存在,发现了51个独特的漏洞(CVE列出了8个)。我们的工作揭示了Android手机UUI保护的现状,补充了主要关注应用程序的现有研究。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Post-GDPR Threat Hunting on Android Phones: Dissecting OS-level Safeguards of User-unresettable Identifiers
—Ever since its genesis, Android has enabled apps to access data and services on mobile devices. This however involves a wide variety of user-unresettable identifiers (UUIs), e.g., the MAC address, which are associated with a device permanently. Given their privacy sensitivity, Android has tightened its UUI access policy since its version 10, in response to the increasingly strict privacy protection regulations around the world. Non- system apps are restricted from accessing them and are required to use user-resettable alternatives such as advertising IDs. In this work, we conduct a systematic study on the effective- ness of the UUI safeguards on Android phones including both Android Open Source Project (AOSP) and Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) phones. To facilitate our large-scale study, we propose a set of analysis techniques that discover and assess UUI access channels. Our approach features a hybrid analysis that consists of static program analysis of Android Framework and forensic analysis of OS images to uncover access channels. These channels are then tested with differential analysis to identify weaknesses that open any attacking opportunity. We have conducted a vulnerability assessment on 13 popular phones of 9 major manufacturers, most of which are top-selling and installed with the recent Android versions. Our study reveals that UUI mis- handling pervasively exists, evidenced by 51 unique vulnerabilities found (8 listed by CVE). Our work unveils the status quo of the UUI protection in Android phones, complementing the existing studies that mainly focus on apps’
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