地理标志:CAIEIRAS岛海鲜蛋糕的潜力- vitoria /ES

J. Carolino, U. Pagel, G. Fornaciari, R. Xavier, L. Candeias
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文旨在分析Goiás中乙醇分销市场的交易成本经济学(TCE),考虑乙醇工厂与经销商之间的契约关系。方法包括定性分析和书目检索,收集二手数据和原始数据。结果表明,考虑到商业化集团的组织,乙醇分销市场中代理商协调的重要性。在实证分析中验证了有限理性和机会主义行为假设的存在;通过对四家乙醇厂的研究,得出了资产交易的不确定性、频率和专用性的属性。我们得出结论,乙醇工厂和经销商之间的关系分为两种治理结构:现货市场和合同(混合)。研究发现,乙醇市场存在交易成本高、供应链缺乏协调、不确定性高、代理商机会主义等特点,而乙醇市场的销售价格取决于供求关系。第二,尽管代理商的合理性有限,地点和实物资产具有高度特异性,但描述了代理商之间的高度协调,特别是在乙醇分配中使用合同(平均一年的作物)。因此,合同产生了更高的效率和保障措施,以确保乙醇供应在市场上的稳定性,并允许减少交易成本、机会主义行为和环境不确定性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
INDICAÇÃO GEOGRÁFICA: O POTENCIAL DA TORTA DE MARISCOS DA ILHA DAS CAIEIRAS – VITÓRIA/ES
The paper aims to analyze the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) in ethanol distribution market in Goiás, considering the contractual relationship between the ethanol plants with the distributors. The methodology consists of qualitative analysis and bibliographic search, collection of secondary data and primary data. The result points to the importance of coordination of agents in the ethanol distribution market, considering the organization of commercialization groups. In the analysis of TCE verified the presence of behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism of the agents; the attributes of the uncertainty of transactions, frequency and specificity of the assets according to research conducted in four ethanol plants. We conclude that the relationship between ethanol plants and the distributors is divided into two governance structures: spot market and contracts (hybrid). The first reveals that there are characteristics of high transaction costs to the market, lack of coordination in the supply chain, high uncertainty and opportunism of the agents, while the sales price depends on supply and demand in the ethanol market. The second, despite the limited rationality of agents and high specificity locational and physical assets, describes a high coordination between agents, especially with the use of contracts (on average one year crop) in the distribution of ethanol. Therefore, the contracts generate greater efficiency and safeguards to ensure the supply of ethanol stability in the market and also allow the reduction of transaction costs, opportunistic actions and environmental uncertainty.
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