{"title":"马解阵线各派的制度、意识形态和战斗经验","authors":"Amelia Hoover Green","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501726477.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter describes the variation in armed-group institutions across subgroups of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and over time and reconstructs the ways that institutional variation affected FMLN combatants' mindsets. It specifically considers the FMLN's two largest subgroups: the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL) and the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP). From its inception in 1972, ERP leaders adopted a militarist orientation, believing a small revolutionary vanguard would provide inspiration for a broader uprising among the people. Politics were secondary; indeed, the ERP formed a political wing only after several years of existence as an armed revolutionary organization. The ERP's militarist approach emphasized the utility of civilians as allies to the military effort. The FPL, by contrast, initially followed a strategy of prolonged popular war. This approach emphasizes the political aspects of guerrilla war over the military aspects. It views civilians and civilian agreement as essential to the revolutionary project.","PeriodicalId":273522,"journal":{"name":"The Commander's Dilemma","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Institutions, Ideologies, and Combatant Experiences in FMLN Factions\",\"authors\":\"Amelia Hoover Green\",\"doi\":\"10.7591/cornell/9781501726477.003.0005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter describes the variation in armed-group institutions across subgroups of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and over time and reconstructs the ways that institutional variation affected FMLN combatants' mindsets. It specifically considers the FMLN's two largest subgroups: the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL) and the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP). From its inception in 1972, ERP leaders adopted a militarist orientation, believing a small revolutionary vanguard would provide inspiration for a broader uprising among the people. Politics were secondary; indeed, the ERP formed a political wing only after several years of existence as an armed revolutionary organization. The ERP's militarist approach emphasized the utility of civilians as allies to the military effort. The FPL, by contrast, initially followed a strategy of prolonged popular war. This approach emphasizes the political aspects of guerrilla war over the military aspects. It views civilians and civilian agreement as essential to the revolutionary project.\",\"PeriodicalId\":273522,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Commander's Dilemma\",\"volume\":\"62 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-10-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Commander's Dilemma\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501726477.003.0005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Commander's Dilemma","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501726477.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Institutions, Ideologies, and Combatant Experiences in FMLN Factions
This chapter describes the variation in armed-group institutions across subgroups of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and over time and reconstructs the ways that institutional variation affected FMLN combatants' mindsets. It specifically considers the FMLN's two largest subgroups: the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL) and the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP). From its inception in 1972, ERP leaders adopted a militarist orientation, believing a small revolutionary vanguard would provide inspiration for a broader uprising among the people. Politics were secondary; indeed, the ERP formed a political wing only after several years of existence as an armed revolutionary organization. The ERP's militarist approach emphasized the utility of civilians as allies to the military effort. The FPL, by contrast, initially followed a strategy of prolonged popular war. This approach emphasizes the political aspects of guerrilla war over the military aspects. It views civilians and civilian agreement as essential to the revolutionary project.