欧盟成员国必须尊重人权吗?欧盟“联邦权利法案”对成员国的适用

C. Nagy
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引用次数: 3

摘要

尊重基本权利是欧洲联盟的基石之一。这是加入欧盟的先决条件,也是欧盟的核心价值之一。然而,正如最近欧洲委员会和一些成员国之间的争议所揭示的那样,欧盟法律没有有效的机制来迫使成员国尊重一般的基本权利和自由。本文介绍并考察了欧盟的基本权利保护架构。首先,它表明《欧盟基本权利宪章》(“欧盟权利法案”)主要适用于欧盟机构(即“联邦”机构);它只适用于作为欧盟“代理人”的成员国(当他们执行欧盟法律时)。虽然这种做法似乎不合逻辑,但它确实有其明确和合理的理由,而且远非史无前例。事实上,它与美国第一世纪的宪法架构非常相似。值得注意的是,虽然欧盟确实有办法在成员国侵犯基本权利的情况下要求其承担责任,但这种行动是一颗“核弹”,很难适用于处理人权问题;更不用说,这种应用在政治上几乎是不可能实现的。其次,它证明了至少在某些情况下,欧盟委员会是如何“从已有的情况出发”的,因为它使用了与欧盟法律无关的(即与人权无关的)条款来保护基本权利(例如,内部市场的自由流动原则来保护少数人的权利,或禁止基于年龄的歧视来保护司法独立)。利用这些经济权利的“支持性附带效应”是新颖的,但并非完全没有先例。事实上,它类似于美国国会如何利用其商业权力来保护公民权利。第三,它认为,尽管目前的架构肯定不是所有可能的世界中最好的,人权的完全联邦化是一个诱人的选择,但“联邦权利法案”(欧盟基本权利宪章)的分歧有坚实的基础,联邦化只有在那些违反“离婚理由”的基本价值观和权利方面才具有说服力。因此,虽然目前的制度显然需要改革,但就方法而言,这种宪法结构在多元的欧洲联邦需要的背景下有其优点。一方面,保护人权的核心不能受地域差异的影响,侵犯这些权利的核心不能以宪法的同一性为理由。另一方面,在这个范围之外,用欧洲人权法院的术语来说,欧洲联邦制要求尊重会员国的增值幅度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do European Union Member States Have to Respect Human Rights? The Application of the European Union's 'Federal Bill of Rights' to Member States
The respect of fundamental rights is one of the cornerstones of the European Union. It is a precondition of membership and it is listed among the core values of the Union. Still, as the recent controversies between the European Commission and some Member States revealed, EU law contains no effective mechanism to compel Member States to respect fundamental rights and freedoms in general. This paper presents and examines the EU architecture of fundamental rights protection. First, it demonstrates that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the “EU bill of rights”) applies predominantly to EU institutions (that is, “federal” institutions); it applies to Member States only when they act as the EU’s “agents” (when they implement EU law). Although this approach may appear to be illogical, it does have its clear and legitimate reasons and it is far from unprecedented. In fact, it very much resembles the first century of the United States constitutional architecture. It is to be noted that though the EU does have the means to call Member States to account in case they violate fundamental rights, this action is a “nuclear bomb” and is hardly apt for handling human rights problems; not to mention that the application of this is almost politically unattainable. Second, it demonstrates how, in certain cases at least, the Commission “cooked from what it had” in that it used unconnected (that is, non-human-rights-related) provisions of EU law to shelter fundamental rights (e.g., the free movement principles of the internal market to protect minority rights or the prohibition of discrimination based on age to protect the independence of the judiciary). The use of the “supportive by-effects” of these economic rights is novel but not fully unprecedented. In fact, it resembles how the U.S. Congress used its commerce power to protect civil rights. Third, it argues that although the present architecture is certainly not the best of all possible worlds and the full federalization of human rights is a tempting option, the bifurcation of the “federal bill of rights” (the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) has a solid basis and federalization is compelling only regarding those fundamental values and rights the violation of which qualifies as a “ground of divorce.” Accordingly, while the current system obviously calls for a reform, in terms of approach, this constitutional architecture has its merits in the context of what the multicolored European federation needs. On the one hand, the core of human rights protection cannot be subject to territorial variations and the violation of the nucleus of these rights cannot be justified with reference to constitutional identity. On the other hand, outside this sphere, to use the terminology of the European Court of Human Rights, European federalism demands respect for the Member States’ margin of appreciation.
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