Grøstl和Skein的侧通道分析

Christina Boura, Sylvain Lévêque, David Vigilant
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引用次数: 10

摘要

这项工作从侧信道分析的角度对SHA-3竞赛的两个决赛选手进行了详细的研究。对于这两个功能,当用作MAC时,本文提出了执行功率分析的检测策略。除了经典的MAC模式外,还分析了另外两种被提出的MAC模式,即gro østl的包络MAC模式和Skein-MAC模式。因此,给出了阻碍一阶DPA或CPA的软件对策的例子。为了验证我们的选择,我们在一个32位基于arm的智能卡上实现了HMAC-Grøstl、HMAC-Skein以及对策。我们还在实践中对未保护和受保护的实现进行了功率分析攻击。最后,讨论了两个版本之间的性能差异。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Side-Channel Analysis of Grøstl and Skein
This work provides a detailed study of two finalists of the SHA-3 competition from the side-channel analysis point of view. For both functions when used as a MAC, this paper presents detected strategies for performing a power analysis. Besides the classical MAC mode, two additionally proposed constructions, the envelope MAC for Grøstl and the Skein-MAC for Skein, are analyzed. Consequently, examples of software countermeasures thwarting first-order DPA or CPA are given. For the validation of our choices, we implemented HMAC-Grøstl, HMAC-Skein as well as countermeasure son a 32-bit ARM-based smart card. We also mounted power analysis attacks in practice on both unprotected and protected implementations. Finally, the performance difference between both versions is discussed.
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