退还排放费计划-一个具成本效益及在政治上可接受的减少氮氧化物排放的工具?

Arild Heimvik
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了排放补偿机制在实现特定的氮氧化物减排目标路径中的有效性。REP计划对排放征收费用,并将收取的资金退还给排放企业。可再生能源计划已被强调为对标准排放税的一些关切的补救办法。然而,再生能源计划的目的是实现有效的减排。在本文中,我们考察了两种REP设计,并分析了它们在企业层面上对异质性企业的减排激励。在第一种方案中,根据企业的减排量给予退款。第二种方案根据排放企业的产出份额给予退款。结果表明,虽然两种设计都能实现特定的目标路径,但只有基于减排的退款才具有成本效益。两种设计针对不同的目标,因此提供不同的缓解激励,并导致不同的分配结果。另一方面,这两种设计都没有增加政府收入,也没有严格遵守污染者付费的原则。然而,可再生能源计划具有吸引监管机构的特质,尤其是在征收有效的排放税不可行的情况下。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Refunded Emission Payments Scheme – A Cost-Efficient and Politically Acceptable Instrument for Reduction of NOx-Emissions?
The paper studies the effectiveness of a refunded emission payments (REP) scheme in achieving a specific target path of NOx-emission reductions. A REP scheme levies a charge on emissions and refunds the collected funds back to the emitting firms. REP schemes have been highlighted as a remedy to some concerns about standard emission taxes. The purpose of a REP scheme, however, is to achieve effective emission reductions. We examine two REP designs in this paper and analyze their incentives for emission mitigation at the firm level, with heterogenous firms. In the first design, refunds are given to firms based on their emission cuts. The second design gives refunds based on output shares of the emitting firms. Results show that while both designs can achieve the specific target path, only refunding based on emission-reductions is cost-efficient. The two designs target different objectives and hence, provide different mitigation incentives, and result in different distributional outcomes. On the other hand, neither design raises governmental revenue, nor do they strictly adhere to the polluter-pays-principle. However, a REP scheme has qualities that should make it appealing to regulators, especially if an effective emission tax is unfeasible.
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